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MASTER'S THESIS

**The geopolitical interests of Ukraine in the
modern system of international relations**

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THESIS PROJECT

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Thesis Title: The geopolitical interests of Ukraine in the modern system of international relations

Supervisor: Bořivoj Hnízdo, PhD.

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Objectives

1. Analyze contemporary trends in the geopolitics of Ukraine by highlighting major historical impacts, its geopolitical potential and the response to the modern geopolitical challenges;
2. Evaluate Ukraine's geopolitical interests in the relations with its strategic partners such as the United States, Russian Federation and the countries of the Central-Eastern Europe;
3. Define the role of Ukraine in the regional and global processes;
4. Accumulate and analyze data on Ukraine's geopolitical trends in order to support arguments to develop own optimal geopolitical concept of Ukraine.

Structure of the Thesis

Thesis Project

List of Abbreviations

Abstract

Anotace

Introduction

Subject Significance

Thesis Desposition

1. Theoretical considerations
2. The nature and genesis of the geopolitics in Ukraine
 - 2.1. The roots of Ukrainian geopolitics
 - 2.2. The geopolitics of Ukraine in the Soviet era
 - 2.3. The formation of a new geopolitical thought in Ukraine
3. The geopolitical position of Ukraine in the modern era: the relations with strategic partners
 - 3.1. Transformation of geopolitical position of Ukraine in the context of relations with the countries of Central-Eastern Europe
 - 3.2. The United States – Ukrainian strategic relations
 - 3.3. Geopolitical interests of Ukraine in the cooperation with Russian Federation and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
4. The geopolitical role of Ukraine in the globalization processes
 - 4.1. Ukraine in the system of global international organizations
 - 4.2. The global problems of international community: the view from Kiev

Conclusion

Bibliography

Appendices

Overview

The development of the modern system of international relations is different compared to the such development in the last century. In the era of social and economic inequality our civilization created such global problems as food shortages, terrorism, corruption, proliferation of deadly weapons, ecological disasters, demographic processes, escalation of conflicts for energy resources and many other problems.

In this case, geopolitics has become an increasingly important study as the world faced with rising competition for regional and global domination. This competition greatly affects the system of international relations and provokes the shift in the balance of power, dividing the world into geopolitical players and geopolitical subjects. Ukraine, being the largest contiguous European state at the crossroads between Eurasian Russia and Western European civilization, emphasizes the importance to promote its geopolitical interests and further development of its geopolitical doctrine in order to become the most influential geopolitical player in the region. In this regard, the thesis promotes greater understanding of recent trends in Ukraine's geopolitics, its impact on the global processes, analyses the geostrategic relations between Ukraine and its partners, and provides evaluation of Ukraine's geopolitics in the future.

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DECLARATION:

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work, based on the sources and literature listed in the appended bibliography. The thesis as submitted is 114 (one hundred and fourteen) manuscript pages.

Andriy Bryn

In Prague, May, 18, 2011

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Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations.....	11
Abstract.....	12
Anotace.....	13
Introduction.....	14
Subject Significance.....	14
Thesis Desposition.....	19
1. Theoretical considerations.....	21
2. The nature and genesis of the geopolitics in Ukraine.....	28
2.1.The roots of Ukrainian geopolitics.....	28
2.2.The geopolitics of Ukraine in the Soviet era.....	36
2.3.The formation of a new geopolitical thought in Ukraine.....	45
3. The geopolitical position of Ukraine in the modern era: the relations with strategic partners.....	54
3.1. Transformation of geopolitical position of Ukraine in the context of relations with the countries of Central-Eastern Europe.....	55
3.2.The United States – Ukrainian strategic relations.....	63
3.3. Geopolitical interests of Ukraine in the cooperation with Russian Federation and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).....	72
4. The geopolitical role of Ukraine in the globalization processes.....	78
4.1.Ukraine in the system of global international organizations.....	78
4.2.The global problems of international community: the view from Kiev.....	88
Conclusion.....	94
Bibliography.....	99
Appendices.....	108

List of Abbreviations

CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States
CEE - Central Eastern Europe
CSCE - Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DOD - Department of Defense
EU - European Union
FTA - Free Trade Association
GEF - Global Ecological Fund
GUAM - Georgia – Ukraine - Azerbaijan – Moldova - Organization for
Democracy and Economic Development
ILO - International Labor Organization
ITU - International Telecommunication Union
KFOR - Kosovo Force
NATO - North-Atlantic Treaty Organization
NKVD - The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (USSR)
NPT - Non-proliferation Treaty
NWFZ - Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
START - Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
UEFA - Union of European Football Associations
UCCA - Ukrainian Congress Committee of America
UKRPOLBAT - Ukrainian – Polish Peace Force Battalion
UN - United Nations
UNICEF - United Nations Children's Fund
UNDP - United Nations Development Program (UNDP),
UNCTAD - United Nations Conference on Trade And Development
UNIDO - United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNPFA - United Nations Population Fund
USA - United States of America
USSR - The Union of Soviet Socialistic Republic/Ukrainian Soviet Socialistic
Republic
WIPO - World Intellectual Property Organization
WFP - World Food Program
WTO - World Treaty Organization

Abstract

This thesis focuses on the analysis of contemporary trends in the geopolitics of Ukraine by highlighting major periods in the formation of its geopolitics, geopolitical interests of Ukraine in the relations with strategic partners, and assessing eventual development of Ukraine's geopolitics with a special emphasis on the cooperation within global universal international organizations such as the United Nations .

The research applies an analysis of history of Ukraine's geopolitics in order to promote a better understanding of recent trends in the country's foreign policy and its geopolitical interests, analyze the relations of Ukraine with its strategic partners, including the United States, countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Russian Federation and the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and provide an assessment for the future Ukraine's geopolitics. In this regard, the study argues that the Ukraine's geopolitics and its interests are determined by the large scale of factors, which derive from historical, socio-cultural, geographic, political and economic specifics of Ukraine.

Based on the analysis of the main trends in the modern Ukraine's geopolitics, assesment of Ukraine's geopolitical potential and the current global geopolitical situation, the thesis concludes that there are prospects for a creation of a new Ukraine's geopolitical doctrine. At the same time, the study argues that Ukraine needs to continue its political and socio-economic reforms in order to become an influential regional leader and promote further development of its geopolitical interests.

Anotace

Tato práce je zaměřena na analýzu současných trendů v geopolitice Ukrajiny, zvýrazněním hlavních období formování geopolitiky, geopolitických zájmu Ukrajiny ve vztazích se strategickými partnery, a posuzování eventuálního rozvoje geopolitiky Ukrajiny. Zvláštní důraz je kladen na spolupráci v rámci mezinárodních organizací, např. Organizace spojených národů.

Výzkum aplikuje analýzu dějin geopolitiky Ukrajiny s cílem podpoření lepšího pochopení současných trendů zahraniční politiky země a její geopolitických zájmu, analýzy vztahu Ukrajiny s jejími strategickými partnery, včetně Spojených států, zemí střední a východní Evropy, Ruska a zemí Společenství nezávislých států, a poskytnutí hodnocení budoucnosti ukrajinské geopolitiky. V tomto ohledu studie tvrdí, že ukrajinská geopolitika a její zájmy jsou určeny širokou škálou faktorů, které jsou odvozeny od historických, socio-kulturních, geografických, politických a ekonomických zvláštností Ukrajiny.

Na základě analýzy hlavních trendů v geopolitice moderní Ukrajiny, hodnocení ukrajinského geopolitického potenciálu a současné globální geopolitické situace, práce dochází k závěru, že jsou perspektivy pro vytvoření nové geopolitické doktríny Ukrajiny. Současně, studie tvrdí, že Ukrajina musí pokračovat ve svých politických a sociálně-ekonomických reformách, aby se stala vlivným regionálním lídrem a podporovala další rozvoj svých geopolitických zájmu

Introduction

The geopolitics has become an increasingly important within the theory of international relations as the world's political situation has changed due to the rising competition among the states for regional and global domination. The competition for the political, geographical, economic, cultural, ideological and religious domination significantly affected the system of international relations and provoked the shift in the balance of power, dividing the world into the two categories of states. The first category includes geopolitical players, countries, which conduct their own independent foreign policy, based on the protection of its national interests, and play an important role in the providing of security and stability in a region or world in total. Other category includes objects of such policy, countries, which fail to influence the political, economic or socio-cultural situation due to their weak geopolitical potential.

Ukraine, being the largest contiguous European state, owns a great geopolitical potential. Its large territories, an access to the Black and Asov seas, demographic potential (more than 48 million people), rich mineral resources, military potential, high level of intellectual, scientific and economic potential, including high-technologies (like aerospace engineering and nuclear research), make Ukraine an important geopolitical player in the region. Ukraine emphasizes the importance to continue its further political and socio-economic development in order to keep this status. In this regard, the thesis promotes greater understanding of recent trends in Ukraine's geopolitics, analyses its history of development, the geostrategic relations of Ukraine with its partners and the role of Ukraine in the complex of globalization processes.

Subject Significance

Traditionally geopolitics was considered as the science about the geographical aspects of international relations, the influence of territorial size and military potential on the political actions of the state. However, today there is a need in the totally new concept of geopolitics. The modern geopolitical activity of the state can be defined as activity of the subject of international relations in the context of the whole range of different factors (not only geographic) in order to realize its vital geopolitical interests.

The last decade of the XX century is characterized with the large-scale socio-political changes associated with the transformation of the entire global geopolitical space. For Ukraine as one of the key geopolitical players on the political map of Europe it is extremely important to develop own modern geopolitical concept, which would respond its geographic, historical, political, demographic, economic and socio-cultural interests.

. Under these conditions, the research of Ukraine's geopolitics acquires additional attention. The modern Ukrainian geopolitics, as a part of world's geopolitical science, has just started to develop. However, the modern research of Ukraine's geopolitics is characterized with an increasing number of Ukrainian and foreign political scientists, who choose this issue as their field of interest. At the same time, we believe that our study will also contribute to the theoretical research of Ukraine's geopolitics, its interests and goals in the context of globalization processes.

The relevance of topic being researched in this thesis is determined by the following main reasons:

1. As we have previously mentioned modern geopolitics of Ukraine undergoes the process of its development and formation. Under these conditions our thesis will have scientific importance as the contribution to the comprehensive scientific research of modern Ukraine's geopolitics and its interests.

2. Ukraine as a sovereign independent state conducts its foreign policy on the basis of mutual beneficial and cooperative ties with other countries. The relations with these countries directly influence the geopolitics of Ukraine. This research is called to explore the challenges and major geopolitical problems of Ukraine in the context of the geostrategic relations with its partners, such as the United States, Russian Federation and the countries of Central-Eastern Europe. The conclusions of this thesis will help better understanding of the current Ukraine's geopolitical processes.

3. It is extremely important for us to study a problem of Ukrainian geopolitical interests in the context of cooperation with international regional and global organizations, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), GUAM - Georgia – Ukraine - Azerbaijan – Moldova - Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European Union (EU), the Visegrad Group and the United Nations (UN). The Cooperation with the United Nations in the political, socio-economic and

humanitarian spheres in the context of solving of global problems has an especial interest for us.

The main *objectives of the thesis* are to analyze contemporary trends in the geopolitics of Ukraine by highlighting major historical impacts, its geopolitical potential and the response to the modern geopolitical challenges; evaluate Ukraine's geopolitical interests in the relations with its strategic partners such the United States, Russian Federation and the countries of the Central-Eastern Europe; define the role of Ukraine in the regional and global processes; accumulate and analyze data on Ukrainian geopolitical trends in order to support arguments to develop modern geopolitical concept of Ukraine.

The object of research includes the global political space, which was cardinally changed due to the geopolitical transformation processes in the modern system of international relations. The geopolitics of Ukraine, its geopolitical interests and the role of Ukraine in the context of globalization processes are referred as *subject of research*.

The theoretical and methodological basis of a research is the legislative documents of Ukraine, government analytical reports related to the sphere of international relations of Ukraine, scientific and theoretical studies of Ukrainian and foreign political scientists on the geopolitics of Ukraine. This thesis appliesgnoseological, philosophical, historical and political analysis of Ukraine's geopolitics and its interests. In addition retrospective analysis of history of Ukraine showed the stages of formation and development of Ukraine's geopolitical orientation and the main trends of modern national geopolitics. We widely used a comparative method to compare similar phenomena of social and political processes in the different periods of Ukrainian history in order to define the general interests and principles of Ukraine's geopolitics. The system method allowed us to consider geopolitics as a whole, well-structured and well-organized system, which is defined by a large number of different factors. Functional method helped us to explore the strategic relations between the countries and their economic and political cooperation in order to predict the nature of possible problems. This method is based on the positive, mutually beneficial and pragmatic character and used in the analysis of relations between Ukraine and the USA, Russia and the CIS and CEE countries. The research is based on the principles of objectivity, historical principle, and specificity.

Theoretical and methodological basis of the thesis are works of scholars, specializing on problems of geopolitics, history of diplomacy and foreign policy, international relations, problems of transition countries, international organizations and global studies. In particular, approaches to the Ukraine's geopolitics, presented in the works of such scholars as John A. Agnew, Nayyar Shamsi, Saul Bernard Cohen, Colin S. Gray, Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby, Paul Routledge, Lalita Rana, Pushpesh K. Pant, C. Dale Walton, Nurit Kliot, David Newman, Richard Jackson, Neil Howe, Henry L. Bretton, Myron Weiner, Sharon Stanton Russell, Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal, Chris Brown, Martin Griffiths, Terry O'Callaghan, Steven C. Roach, Valerie Hansen, Kenneth Curtis, Kenneth R. Curtis, Orest Subtelny, Janet Martin, Osyp Zinkevych, Andrew Sorokowski, Paul Robert Magocsi, Bohdan Nahaylo, Richard Pipes, James P. Nichol, Robert Legvold, Celeste A. Wallander, Ilya Prizel, Serhii Plokyh, Yuriy Lypa, Kataryna Wolczuk, David R. Marples, Jan Zielonka, Alex Pravda, Anders Aslund, F. Stephen Larrabee, Serhiy Datsiuk, Volodymyr Hranovsky, Andrew Evans, Marc Di Duca, Dominique Auzias, Jean-Paul Labourdette and many others.

In particular, approaches to the analyses of the early history of formation of Ukraine's geopolitics presented in the works of such authors as Paul Robert Magocsi, Osyp Zinkevych, Orest Subtelny, Serhiy Plokyh, Ilya Prizel, Bohdan Nahaylo. Martin Malia. For example, Orest Subtelny in his book "Ukraine: a history", published by the University of Toronto, argues that Ukraine did not appear with the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, but Ukraine is a state with more than 1000 year history, which starts from Kievan Rus. The history of Ukraine is a history of Ukrainian nation in the struggle for own independence. The author offers an assessment of the various events in the history of Ukraine to help better understanding of its historical, geographical, political, economic and socio-cultural characteristics. Furthermore, Orest Subtelny discusses how those historical challenges reflected in the idea of Ukrainian dream and its national interests.

To analyze the history of Ukraine's geopolitical thought in the Soviet period we explored the works of such scholars James P. Nichol, L. G. Churchward, Jeffrey Zuehlke, Serhiy Plokyh, Ilya Prizel, Yuriy Lypa and Kataryna Wolczuk. One of such works a book "Diplomacy of Former Soviet Republics", published by James Nichol, is the first comprehensive study about the diplomatic institution and diplomatic activities of the former Soviet republics, including Ukraine, in the late Gorbachev

era. The clear understanding of the history of Ukraine in this period helps us to explore the geopolitical interests and potential of Ukraine before the dissolution of the USSR and new era of independent geopolitical thought. James Nichol states that Ukraine as the second biggest Soviet state received a great territorial, industrial, military and demographic potential. According to the author we will analyze, on which geopolitical potential Ukraine could base its modern geopolitical doctrine and how Ukraine could improve its modern geopolitical position.

The evaluation of Ukrainian geostrategic relations in the context of relations with other states, including the United States, Russia, and the countries of Central-Eastern Europe, is based on the analyses provided in the books and reports of F. Stephen Larrabee, Oleksandr Pavlyuk, Andriy Yermolaev, Martin Kelly, Andrew Jeffrey, Nataliya Bets and others. Each of these authors gives its personal opinion on the strategic importance of Ukraine's relations with its partners. However, such relations could be helpful, only if they are mutually beneficial and respond the national interests. Ukraine should pay an especial attention to the relations with its neighboring states in order to provide security and stability in the regions. In the analytical report "Ukraine and the Visegrad Group: achievements, problems and perspective of collaboration", Nataliya Bets explores the strategic importance of such relation with the Visegrad States in the context of common historical events, transition economic and political processes and socio-cultural similarities. At the same time the author argues that Ukraine has a high interest in the cooperation with the Visegrad states within a framework of regional organizations, including the Visegrad Group.

Since the thesis also focuses on the Ukraine's role in the globalization processes, a large number of reports, official statements by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Administration of the President of Ukraine, Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations, National Institute for Strategic Studies, Embassies of Ukraine to the United States, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and other countries, Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine, Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Parliament of Ukraine, think tanks, institutes for strategic studies and news agencies of Ukraine are used as a basis the analysis for the theoretical considerations and practical part of this thesis. However, today we would like to highlight the article, written by the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, "Problems without passports". We should mention that the last sub-chapter and

partly conclusion part was based on the article of Kofi Annan. The significance of this article consists in the fact that: it evaluates the humanity problems in the context of all international community, assesses the global strategies in the solving of these problems, and announce the proposal to include the global problems to the geopolitical doctrines of each state.

Practical and theoretical value of this thesis is that the main part and conclusions of the thesis are a contribution to the theoretical study about the geopolitics and geopolitical interests of Ukraine, its role in the cooperation with other countries in the context of modern globalization processes. In the practical context, the results of this thesis can assist the further research of Ukraine's geopolitics, increasing the political culture of politicians, diplomats and other decision-makers of Ukraine and other states. The conclusions of the work will help to understand the current geopolitical processes in Ukraine and region. The parts of thesis can be also used for the teaching and the development of special courses on geopolitics of Ukraine in the universities, preparation of diplomatic personal for the embassies in Ukraine and other spheres of international relations. Results of this thesis can be used for developing and teaching courses „Geopolitics of Ukraine“, „Ukraine and Globalization,“ „Ukraine in the system of International Relations“ and other related courses.

Conclusions about the need of modern geopolitical concept of Ukraine, assessments of Ukraine's role in the context of globalization processes and solving of global problems, and conclusions about the Ukraine's geopolitical future will be provided as well.

It will be concluded that Ukrainian geopolitical doctrine should focus on multidimensional foreign policy of Ukraine, protection of its geopolitical interests and further processes of national socio-economic development.

Thesis Disposition

In order to promote a better understanding of the history of Ukraine's geopolitical interests, modern trends of Ukraine's geopolitical thought, the current state of Ukraine's geostrategic relations with its partners and the role of Ukraine in the globalization processes, the thesis is structured into an introduction, four substitutive chapters and conclusion part.

In the introduction part we explain the choice of topic for research, its relevance, identify the object and subject of research, formulate objectives of the research, describe the theoretical and methodological basis of the thesis, give information about the theoretic and practical value of thesis, and present the structure of the research.

The first chapter seeks to define the term “geopolitics” and “interest” in general. The view of geopolitics and interests from the scholars of different geopolitical schools are presented. The various approaches and concepts are explored and followed by the definition of term “geopolitics” and “interest” in the context of our topic.

The second chapter discusses the history of formation of Ukraine’s geopolitical concept in the different periods. In order to have a better understanding of Ukrainian geopolitics and interests we will explore the international relations, political traditions and culture in three different epochs: the period of Kievan Rus, Soviet Era and modern times.

The third chapter aims to analyze activities of Ukraine in the sphere of international relations with the countries of Central-Eastern Europe, the United States, Russian Federation and the Commonwealth of Independent States. We will carry a research on the bilateral relations between Ukraine and these countries in the sphere of political, economic, military and socio-cultural cooperation. The main geopolitical interests of Ukraine in the context of partnership with other countries are our task to explore in this chapter.

In the fourth chapter we want to explore geopolitical interests of Ukraine within such global organization as the United Nations, activities of Ukraine in the solving of global problems and future challenges to the geopolitics of Ukraine.

Finally, conclusions about the major trends in the development of Ukraine’s geopolitics, its geopolitical interests in the relations with other countries and international organizations, Ukraine’s role in the solving of global problems, and the optimal Ukraine’s geopolitical doctrine are presented in the conclusion part of Thesis.

1. Theoretical considerations

In this chapter we will explain the basic principals of geopolitics and national interest in the theory of international relations, before the term “geopolitics” and “national interest” will be defined. In the following chapters of this thesis we will also focus on the analyze of the main historical, geographical, economic, socio-cultural and political factors of geopolitics, its influence on the decision-making processes and the role of geopolitics in the protection of vital national interests of each country (on our case: Ukraine)

Today when the world faced with global political changes, the understanding of modern geopolitical principals is very important. That’s why, the complex analysis of the main geopolitical approaches to the theory of international relations together with a deep considerations on the issue of current globalization processes will make a theoretical base of this thesis.

1.1. The definition of geopolitics

The history of geopolitics starts with the dawn of civilization. However, according to the history of the term “geopolitics” began in 1899, when the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén used that definition at the first time.¹ He described a geopolitics as “the theory of the state as a geographical organism or phenomenon in space, i.e., as land, territory, area, or most especially, as country... or the study of the strategies of political organisms in space”.² Kjellén also believed that each state had to fulfill 3 main principles to become a world power. First, all states had to be spacious and located within a large territory. Second, states were forced to have “internal cohesion”. Great Britain can not become a world power, because of its problems with Irish and Welsh dissidents. Third, states had to have a “freedom pf movement” to become a world power.³

For Karl Haushofer, the father of German school of geopolitics, “Geopolitics is the new national science of state, a doctrine on the spatial determinism of all political processes, based on the broad foundations of geography, especially political geography”.⁴ Haushofer wanted to build German school of geopolitik based on the

¹ John A. Agnew, *Geopolitics: re-visioning world politics*, Routledge, 2003, p.5.

² Nayyar Shamsi, *Encyclopaedia of Political Geography*, Anmol Publications PVT. LTD., 2006, p. 11.

³ *Ibid.*, p.10.

⁴ Saul Bernard Cohen, *Geopolitics of the world system*, Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, p.11.

strong ties between the concept of a natural boundary and idea of continuous territorial expansion. The geopolitics had to become the geographic conscience of the state.⁵ Today the level of Haushofer's influence on the German foreign policy is seriously debated. However, we may definitely claim that Karl Haushofer had a great impact on the policy of the Third Reich and its leaders.

Anglo-American school of geopolitics differed from the German school, because of its representatives who were explicitly anti-Nazi. Sir Halford Mackinder, Nickolas J. Spykman and the US Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan were among the founders of future Anglo-American geopolitics.

For example, Halford Mackinder's ideas are important for three reasons.

First, he had a very global view on the international relations: the geopolitics is a new invented perspective to explore the globe as "closed" political space, to see the competition between the great powers as one unified scene. Second, Mackinder created a unique map "The natural seats of power" (Figure 1). An interpretation of the Earth with the centering of the map on Eurasia made that region pivotal and North and South American marginal. At the same time he labeled other areas with such names as "pivot area" or heartland, "inner or marginal crescent" and "lands of the outer or insular crescent".⁶

Third, Mackinder is also remembered because of his "the geographical causation of history". The central part of this history is the relationship between physical geography and transportation technologies. Halford Mackinder defines three epochs of history - pre-Columbian, Columbian and Post-Columbian (Table 1). The author also stresses on the importance of trans-continental European transportation system.⁷

Mackinder divided the surface of the Earth in the World Island (Europe, Asia and Africa) and Periphery (Americas, the British Isles, Oceania). The World Island is much bigger than Periphery and has better location for its industries. The core of the World Island or Heartland is the Eastern Europe. It is comprised of Ukraine, Western Russia and Mittleuropa, where Ukraine contains a huge reserve of grain and natural resources, large territory and the location in the center of Heartland.⁸

⁵ Colin S. Gray, *Geopolitics, geography, and strategy*, Routledge, 1999, p. 9.

⁶ Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby, Paul Routledge, *The geopolitics reader*, Routledge, 2006, p. 19.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Lalita Rana, *Geographical thought*, Concept Publishing Company, 2008, p. 217.

From the Mackinder's point of view, the unique location and large deposits of natural resources together with a large territory has to become the main core of Ukraine's geopolitics. Today we may definitely agree with the author and will try to prove this fact in the following chapters of the thesis.

Another American political scientist Alfred Mahan claimed that the naval supremacy had the primary and foremost importance. Navy might help a state to annex new territories and protect own sovereignty. He also argued that all the seas and oceans were interconnected in the world. Its control gave a state a military advantage and control over the sea trade routes. The state, which was dominating in the waters around the world, determined the flow of the trade and prevented other state from the challenging those situation.⁹

Analyzing the thoughts of American scientists, we may come to conclusion that it is obvious that further development of transportation system in Ukraine together with its gas-transporting pipeline system, access to the sea ports in Black and Asov seas, satellite and rocket launch space programs could also bring additional benefits to the country's geopolitical potential.

At the same time modern geopolitics makes not only the size and shape of territory and access to the sea significant, but also a plenty of other factors. A group of modern geopoliticians stress on the importance of economic factors in the state power. Such factors as natural resources, location along land trade routes, agricultural potential, level of economic development and innovations define the economic power of the state.¹⁰

Such geo-economists, like Ronald R. Pollina, Mickey Kantor, Oliver Williamson, Stephan Haggard, see the struggle for economic domination as the future replacement of the traditional geopolitics. They claim that power in the terms of global market is more important than military capability of the state or the size of territory. The states operate now in the borderless world, because of the globalization processes, which erase the boundaries and promote a new ideology of market and free trade.¹¹

⁹ Pushpesh K. Pant, *International relations in the 21st century*, Tata McGraw-Hill Education, 2011, pp. 20-21.

¹⁰ C. Dale Walton, *Geopolitics and the great powers in the twenty-first century: multipolarity and the revolution in strategic perspective*, Routledge, 2007, p. 22.

¹¹ Nurit Kliot, David Newman, *Geopolitics at the end of the twentieth century: the changing world political map*, Routledge, 2000, p. 57.

Geopoliticians also explore an impact of population on the geopolitics. The connection between the population size and the state's power was important throughout history. From Pericles to Augustus every leader looked for any ways to encourage the size of population in order to raise its strength and prestige.¹² In the words of Hans Morgenthau "no country can remain or become a first-rate power which does not belong to the most populous nations of the earth".¹³ According to the A. Organski, "Population size is the most important determinant of national power. With it, a lack of other determinants of power can be overcome. Without it, great power status is impossible".¹⁴ Headley Bull, a well-known American social scientist, also recognized an importance of the population: "A population of 100 or more today is not sufficient to confer a superpower status upon a nation, but it is widely thought to be necessary for this status".¹⁵ In our case Ukraine as the 48-million country belongs to the most populous European states and possesses a great demographic potential.

Samuel Cohen defines geopolitics as "the analysis of the interaction between, on the one hand, geographical settings and perspectives and, on the other, political processes. The settings are composed of geographical forms and patterns and the multilayered regions that they form. The political processes include forces that operate at the international level and those on the domestic scene that influence international behavior. Both geographical and political processes are dynamic, and each influences and is influenced by the other. Geopolitics addresses the consequences of this interaction."¹⁶

Taking into account the facts listed above, we may say that the definition of geopolitics is broader than just the interaction between the geographical perspectives such as the size and shape of territory or its location and the political process. This term includes also the socio-cultural, economic, historical, religious and other factors, which define the geopolitics of each country and its national interests.

As a result today we would like to formulate our personal definition of the term "geopolitics". The geopolitics is the national doctrine of the state or its national

¹² Richard Jackson, Neil Howe, *The graying of the great powers: demography and geopolitics in the 21st century*, CSIS, 2008, p. 80.

¹³ Myron Weiner, Sharon Stanton Russell, *Demography and national security*, Berghahn Books, 2001, p. 64.

¹⁴ Richard Jackson, p. 80.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Saul Bernard Cohen, p. 12.

science, which is called to form and promote a strategy of decision-making processes that would protect vital national interests. This strategy is often based on the territorial size and location of the state, its military strength, natural resources, population, economic growth, historical and socio-cultural development.

1.2. The term of interest in the geopolitics

Today many politicians and political scientists talk about the importance of state or national interest in the domestic and foreign policy. However, only few of them can explain the definition of term, which stands behind the word “national interest” in the geopolitics.

The term “national interest” remains one of the most important issues to research in the modern theory of international relations, geopolitics and foreign policy analysis. A number of political scientists, geopoliticians, military analytics try to find answers on the questions - What is the national interest? What is the difference between the interest and national interest? What is the link between national interests and foreign policy?

It is extremely complicated to find a precise definition to the term “national interest”. It is a fact that the “national interest” is a fundamental principle guiding the foreign policy of state. Each state is unique and develops its own foreign policy to protect its national geopolitical interests. The “national interest” relates to the state’s geographic, strategic-military and strategic-economic positions in the region and global aspects. These positions might be differently interpreted by the every single state. However, the fact is whatever is said to be a “national interest” is an integral part of the “national heritage” passed from one generation to another to plan, formulate and conduct the state’s foreign policy.¹⁷

The “national interest” might be changed and shaped under the different circumstances. If these circumstances make a state more powerful that it was before, the national interest become different. In this case not only the national interest is dynamic, but the power position and the state’s foreign policy vary with time. That is why, the “national interest” of the certain state we should determine by its current political, economic and socio-cultural circumstances.¹⁸

¹⁷ Henry L. Bretton, *International relations in the nuclear age: one world, difficult to manage*, SUNY Press, 1986, p. 51.

¹⁸ Ibid.

The difference between the “interest” and “national interest” might be explained in the following way. A national interest is usually referred to the relatively homogenous society with its policy preferences and certain internalized norms, which are considered as appropriate. A national interest can also exist when the states have domestic institutions that represent some individuals or groups, who follow the same interests as state. In realist theories the “national interest” is considered as to be state power (Morgenthau, 1978), and neorealists argue that national interests are state survival at minimum, but state power at maximum (Waltz, 1979). The survival can be explained as the elemental goal needed to pursue all the political aims.¹⁹

The interest in the “national interest” was always central to international relations and foreign policy analysis. The constructive approach is developed in this area, because of its focus on the social base involved in the formation of international relations. Most of the scholars claim that the national interests are at base ideas about needs. Non-constructivists argue that the content of those interests is unchangeable and derives from the combination of such desires as survival, power, security and wealth. However, these socially constructed natures of interest are still determined by the material resources and geopolitical situation in the world.²⁰

Sometimes national interests may be complex and difficult to identify, but the realists propose to assume that whatever else states seek, they want to gain the power in order to achieve other goals and protect its own interests. The power is also a complex notion. It is not only a power as a “capability”, a required physical force to achieve goals, but political power, an effective skill to protect own political, socio-cultural, economic and other national interests.²¹

Analyzing the difference between the constructivism and other approaches in the defining of national interest we should not say that only constructivists divide the interest as fixed and given, or research how the national interests might be influenced at the level of geopolitical situation in the world. For example, a non-constructivist Andrew Moravcsik develops a liberal theory of how the states interests derive from the domestic economic interests. Stephen Krasner, a representative of realist school, argues that by presenting national interests the individual rulers want to ensure their

¹⁹ Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal, *The Oxford handbook of international relations*, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 43.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 302.

²¹ Chris Brown, *Understanding international relations*, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 33.

personal survival as leaders. Jon Pevehouse uses rationalist tools to analyze how the constitution of the state and its interests are influenced by their membership in the regional and global organizations.²²

Traditional geopolitics, which was based on the assumptions of political realism, stresses on the significance of state sovereignty and national interests. National interest is also an important term in the theory of international relations. National interest as a concept attracted a great attention of scholars after the World War II. This concept usually divided in two ways. The first way interprets the word “interest” as a need that has the status of an acceptable claim on behalf of the state. On the other hand, the word “interest” might be also used to describe and support particular policies. In this case, the main problem is how to determine the criteria of the correspondence between the interest as a principle and policy, which it is applied.²³

To define the criteria link the concept to the foreign policy and geopolitics Martin Griffiths, an Australian specialist on the theory of international relations, offers us three ways. The first approach (Elitist approach), we may simply equate the national interest with those, who are responsible for the foreign policy (implementation of national geopolitical doctrine). In this case the national interest is what the decision-makers of the state claim about it. The national interest is also something, which defined and defended by the state authority, which have the specific knowledge and the power to represent the whole country. The second approach derives from the realist school of thought and explained the national interest in the terms of the nature of international relations and the motivations of state. In the anarchic system of the international relations the security is the main goal for the foreign policy of every single state. However, such foreign policy should be based on the national interests of the state. The interest is often defined in the terms of power, and power in the terms of interest. The last third approach explains that democratic states identify its national interests when it derives from the nation’s preferences. The national interests can be identified by the external observers, but only by the standards of the nation itself.²⁴

²² Christian Reus-Smit, p. 330.

²³ Martin Griffiths, Terry O’Callaghan, Steven C. Roach, *International relations*: Taylor & Francis, 2008, pp. 216-217.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 217-218.

2. The nature and genesis of the geopolitics in Ukraine

2.1. The roots of Ukrainian geopolitics

Analyzing the geopolitics of Ukraine we have to deeply understand the geography, history and culture of this country. Ukrainian geopolitical interests were formed for more than one thousand-year period that covers a time from the epoch of mighty Kievan Rus with center in Kiev, the precursor to the future slavic Eastern European countries, to the modern geopolitical thought of Ukraine in the XXI century. The first geopolitical thoughts and concepts of Kievan Rus were mainly about the unique location of state in the center of Europe, large territories and access to the Black and Asov seas.

A size of territory and its location on the crossroads of the main Eastern and Western trade routs made Kiev soon the main trading outpost in a region. Kievan Rus hold a strong position on the strengthening of its economic ties with other countries. In 911 and 945 the Principality of Kiev signed a treaty with Byzantium that allowed Rus to do business in Constantinople. Throughout the 10th century the princes of Kiev lead a policy on the elimination of their political rivals, including the Khazars and the Bulgars.²⁵

As we know in the 11th century Kievan Rus became geographically the largest political conglomeration in Europe (Figure 2) and one of the most sophisticated and the most flourishing economies at the time.²⁶ How did the leaders of Kievan Rus achieve such result? What strategy was chosen to protect the national interests of the historical Ukraine? To answer these questions we have to go back to the oldest East Slavic chronicle „The Chronicle of Bygone Years“ (Povest vremennykh let):

„In the year 852 ... the land of Kievan Rus was first named ... 859: The Varangians from beyond the sea imposed a tribute upon the Chuds, the Slavs, the Merians, the Ves, and the Krivichians. But the Khazars imposed it upon the Polianians, the Severians and the Viatichians, and collected a squirrel-skin and a beaver-skin from each hearth. 866-862: The tributaries of the Varangians drove them back beyond the sea, and refusing them further tribute, set out to govern themselves. There was no law among them, but tribe rose against tribe. Discord thus ensued

²⁵ Valerie Hansen, Kenneth Curtis, Kenneth R. Curtis, *Voyages in World History*, Vol. 1, Cengage Learning, 2008, p. 293.

²⁶ Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, University of Toronto Press, 2000, p. 22.

among them, and they began to war one against the other. They said to themselves, „Let us seek a prince who may rule over us, and judge us according to the law.“ They accordingly went overseas to the Varangian Russes: these particular Varangians were known as Russes, just as some are called Normans, Angles or Goths. The Chuds, the Slavs and the Krivichians then said to the people of Rus’: „Our whole land is great and rich, and there is no order in it. Come to rule and reign over us.“ They thus selected three brothers, with their kinsfolk, who took with them all the Russes and migrated“.²⁷

As we might later see the brothers later established the whole Rurikid dynasty with a capital in Kiev. From the above-mentioned chronicle we can find that Ruriks were intelligent and smart rulers, who managed to keep all the tribes under the law. The first leaders of Kievan Rus were extremely active on the international arena. Their political and military achievements demonstrated the coincidence of political and commercial objectives and outcomes. Such foreign policy of the Kievan Rus’ authority caused an open confrontation with Khazaria, the Byzantine, and the steppe nomads.²⁸ Kievan Rus also imposed a complex commercially and military oriented form of organization, which had to establish a level of unity and order over the tribes. Political power of Kievan Rus was centered in the big cities along the major trade routes. To support their geopolitical interests and expansionist inspirations, the Rus’ leadership depended at first on tributes, taxations, tariffs on trade, judicial fees and fines.²⁹

The foreign policy of Kievan Rus and its geopolitical instruments were strongly integrated with the state’s internal political structure. However, such integration together with the inefficiency of the state organization system became later one of the reasons to future fall of the Kievan Rus.

For example, the Grand Prince of Kiev did not have a tight centralized monarchy, and full control over the military power and the formation of foreign policy. These duties were often fell to the rulers of the certain principalities of Kievan Rus. Such division of responsibility gave the dynasty full control over its political units, but the domestic political structure became more complex and

²⁷ Orest Subtelny, p. 22.

²⁸ Janet Martin, *Treasure of the Land of Darkness: The Fur Trade and Its Significance for Medieval Rus*, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 111.

²⁹ Orest Subtelny, pp. 43-44.

dynastic disputes over the succession became more harmful for the political stability in the state and geopolitical arena.³⁰

During the X-XI century Kiev leaders through the multiple sets of foreign relations could establish a large number of contacts with not only Byzantium, but also Scandinavia and the rest of Europe. The fame of the dynamic young state became so well-known that Metropolitan Hilarion declared Kievan Rus known all over the world. It can be also explained, because of its strong marital unions with royal houses ranging from France and the Holy Roman Empire to the Byzantium itself. For example, the son of the Prince Iziaslav was married to the sister of Polish King, Sviatoslav to the sister of the Bishop of Trier, Vsevolod to a member of the Byzantium family, Vsevolod Monomakh to an English Princess, and his son wed to the daughter of the King of Sweden. The dynasty gained a cosmopolitan character.³¹

The acceptance of christianity in 988³² gave an access for Kievan Rus to the group of civilized christian countries. The christianity had also become a strong instrument in the further protection of own geopolitical interests. Eastern Christianity became not only the official religion in the Rus, but a part of big culture of all Slavic people. A new-accepted religion brought a literacy to the Rus and had a great influence on the cultural aspects of the Kievan geopolitics and the geopolitics of future Ukraine.

As we have previously mentioned there was a serious problem with political structure and intradynastic relations. The most serious test for the political unity of Kievan Rus and its military strength were the nomads of steppe, whose military interventions into the Rus at the end of XI century caused big problems for the stability of whole state. The problems to collect revenues from the society, intradynastic struggle for the power and the absence of the centralized monarchy caused to the fragmentation of the state into the smaller political units – principalities by the end of the XII century.³³

The period of the fragmentation and political disintegration was characterised by the frequency with each the title of Grand Prince was changed hands. For example, during 878-1132 years there were 14 Grand Princes, but for the period of

³⁰ Janet Martin, *Medieval Russia, 980-1584*, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 46.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

³² Osyp Zinkevych, Andrew Sorokowski, National Committee to Commemorate the Millennium of Christianity in Ukraine, *A Thousand years of Christianity in Ukraine: an encyclopedic chronology*, Smoloskyp Publishers, Ukraine, 1988, p. 35.

the following three decades (1132-1169) 18 Grand Princes ruled the Kievan Rus. Those years are usually called as the Era of Rus' Desintegration and can be characterised as:

1. The gradual decline of Kiev as political and economic center;
2. The replacement of power to the other cities and regions of Kievan Rus.³⁴

Analyzing the above-mentioned facts we can come to conclusion that intradynastic disputes and instable domestic and foreign situation lead the decline of geopolitical significance of the Kievan Rus. The promising development of the mighty Kievan protostate was also interrupted in the end of XIII century by the commercial decline of the main trading partner Byzantium and especially the Mongol invasion.³⁵

In our opinion, the period of the Kievan Rus was became one of the most significant in the development of Ukrainian foreign policy and the establishment of Ukrainian diplomacy to protect geopolitical interests of the state. It can be explained in the following facts:

1. The leadership of Kievan Rus devoloped a multidimensional way of the foreign policy, which was called to build economic and political relations with the countries of the East and West, North and South.
2. The significant role of the size and location of the state in the defining of geopolitical interests

The economic, socio-cultural, religious and political factors of the period of Kievan Rus reflected the complexity of the geopolitical interests for the future Ukrainian state.

We should understand that the geopolitical situation changed with the Kievan Rus' disintegration. As the result of fragmentation Kievan Rus was divided on Galicia-Volynia, the north of Rus – to the rise of the principality of Suzdal or Muscovites, which gave later a birth of current nation Russia (but not a right to steal the part of name of Kievan Rus for its future country name), Kiev with few other central principalities was occupied by the Golden Horde, the north-western principality of Polotsk became the autonomy of Belarus.

³³ Janet Martin, p. 63.

³⁴ Paul Robert Magocsi, A history of Ukraine, University of Toronto Press, 1996, p. 80.

³⁵ Martin Malia, The Soviet tragedy: a history of socialism in Russia, 1917-1991, Simon and Schuster, 1995, p. 57.

The last era of Kievan Rus history on Ukrainian territory was linked to the rise of one of its principalities, later the Kingdom, of Galicia-Volhynia (Figure 3). Galicia – Volhynia was similar to the rest of Kievan Rus. However, that area had some other geopolitical interests in its relations with foreign states. Located in the western part of Kievan Rus it was less attacked by the nomadic enemies from the East. In the same way Galicia – Volhynia had to build special relations with its bordering neighbor countries, such as Poland, Hungary, and later Lithuania.³⁶

Today we would like to define two important factors, which had an impact on the history of geopolitical interests of Galicia – Volhynia:

1. The demographic factor. It was more densely populated than any other parts of Rus. Such fact allowed a fast growth of agriculture with a large number of landowning people – boyars.
2. Galicia-Volhynian princes gave more power to the boyars than their colleagues from the Kievan Rus. It created later disruptive consequences for the all principality.³⁷

Stepan Rudnytsky, one of the founders of Ukrainian political and military geography, argued: “Twice Galicia played an outstanding role in Ukrainian history: the first time was in the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries, when Ukrainian statehood, ruined in the Dnipro region, found shelter in the Galician – Volhynian principality; the second time came at the end of the nineteenth century, when the Ukrainian cultural movement found shelter beyond the Zbruch river from persecution of Russian government”.³⁸ Rudnytsky claimed that although different political circumstances had risen between Galician and Eastern Ukrainians, both were the same, came from a Kievan Rus and belong to one culture. He supported his ideas with the anthropological data and argued that western Ukraine has a unique mediating position between the Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary from one side, and Central and Eastern Ukraine from another one. This geopolitical position, climate, fauna and flora of Western Ukraine together with other factors made the medieval Ukraine an important geostrategic country in the region.³⁹

³⁶ Paul Robert Magocsi, p. 114.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ C. M. Hann, Paul R. Magocsi, *Galicia: a multicultural land*, University of Toronto Press, 2005 – p. 95

³⁹ Ibid.

Medieval Galicia – Volhynia played an important role in the history of Ukraine, because it was one of those principalities, where the original culture of Kiev was preserved (something much different than Muscovy, which arose from one of the Kievan Rus' principalities – the principality of Vladimir-Suzdal). Galicia – Volhynia preserved the best traditions of Ukrainian foreign policy and geopolitics at first independently, then within the Polish – Lithuanian Commonwealth, until it was carried on during the period of Ukrainian history – the Cossack era.⁴⁰

In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Ukrainian orthodox elite were pressured to adapt the Catholicism and its traditions. In the same way some parts of Western Ukraine were occupied by the polish magnates. That is why, starting from the XVI century, the Ukrainian Cossacks began to emerge a significant military force against the polish state. The Ukrainian Cossacks established an autonomous stronghold - Zaporizhian Sich on the lower of Dniepro or Zaporozhya.⁴¹

Mykhailo Hrushevsky, a prominent Ukrainian academician, historian, politician and statesman, in his preface to the seventh volume of his History described the geopolitical attempts of the Cossacks: “It was the first time in historical memory, the Ukrainian nation came forth actively as the architect of its own destiny and life, rising to a life-or-death struggle for the realization of its dreams and desires.”⁴²

In the beginning of the XVII century the leader of the Cossack era Petro Sahaidachny put the development of the Ukrainian orthodox traditions inherited from Kievan Rus on a new level. Kiev became again the center of culture and education.⁴³

The Ukrainian Cossack State, which existed between the XV and XVII centuries, significantly influenced on the geopolitical situation of Eastern Europe. Due to its unique central location Cossack State had to deal with difficult geopolitical processes in the region and build the relations with other geopolitical players such as Muscovia, Ottoman Empire, Sweden, Valachia, Transylvania, Crimean Khanate and Poland.

The geopolitical interests of Cossack State were rapidly developing and changing due to the dynamic changes in the region. At first, Cossacks, who were

⁴⁰ Paul R. Magocsi, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, Galicia: a historical survey and bibliographic guide, University of Toronto Press, 1983, p. 55.

⁴¹ Bohdan Nahaylo, The Ukrainian resurgence, C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 1999, p. 3

⁴² Serhii Plokyh, Unmaking imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the writing of Ukrainian history, University of Toronto Press, 2005, p. 193

pressured from the side of the Polish state, decided to launch a military uprising against the Poles. That is why, in 1648 a new leader hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky signed a military-political union with the Muscovite state in Pereiaslav in 1654. However, Muscovy not only broke that agreement, but also gave up the interests of Cossacks to the Poles in 1667 by signing the Andrusov Treaty. As a result the Cossack State was divided for the Left-bank and Right-bank parts. In this case, the national geopolitical strategy was dramatically changed. In the same way, the main task remained the same to establish an independent united state on the ethnically Ukrainian territories. It was possible only with a cardinal change of the geopolitical situation in Europe. Ukrainian Cossacks were forced to establish new ties with potential allies. Ukrainian hetman Petro Doroshenko understood such situation and established such Union with Ottoman Empire to combat with the Muscovites and the Poles. After heavy battle the attempt to establish a new unified Cossack state failed. The following attempt to throw off the Muscovite domination was made under the leadership of Ivan Mazepa and his ally Swedish King Charles XII, also ended with a failure.⁴⁴

As a result of the long-lasting exhausting battles, the betrayals of allies, decline of national spirit among Ukrainians and the geopolitical loss of all Europe in the Great Northern War during the 1700-1721 years led to the annexing of most of Ukrainian territories by the Russian Empire (except Galicia, which was under the Austrian control).⁴⁵

In our opinion, the problems of reaching the geopolitical interests of the Cossack state were related to the problem of choosing allies. For example, the political-military union with the Muscovy in 1654 became later the end of the independent foreign policy and diplomacy of the Ukrainian Cossack state. Muscovian (Russian) tsarist leadership did not only give up the interests of Ukraine to the Poles, but under the fear of separatism extremely restricted the development of Ukrainian independent state, history, culture and language.

Similarly to other empires the Moscow regime used cruel, violent administrative methods to govern controlled territories and prevent any trials of separatism. However, such policy had rather opposite effect – it developed a strong desire to

⁴³ Bohdan Nahaylo, p. 3.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Mike Dixon-Kennedy, *Encyclopedia of Russian and Slavic myth and legend*, ABC-CLIO, 1998, p. 285.

preserve national ethnic characteristics and form new Ukrainian political elite, who would fight for a defense of national geopolitical interests in the close future.

The next important stage in the development of Ukrainian geopolitical thought can be referred to the mid of XIX century. In 1847 the first modern Ukrainian political organization the Society of Saints Cyril and Methodius was established in Kiev to promote the equal democratic ideas among the Slavic peoples and opposed Russian autocracy.⁴⁶ In 1900 a society of young Ukrainian found the first political organization – the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP) to give the Ukrainian movement for independence a political expression. This party gave a start for the future Ukrainian party's development in the XX century.⁴⁷

However, the World War I, which occurred in 1914, extremely changed the geopolitical situation not only for Ukrainian people, but for the entire world. As we know the open confrontation between two hostile blocks – The Entente and the Triple Alliance or the Central Powers for economic and military domination became a main reason of the War. Both blocks had a strong desire to annex new territories and expand influence in the world.

Ukraine as non-independent geopolitical actor could not facilitate own foreign policy and was seen as a controlled part of Russian Empire. However, some countries like Germany had specific plans about Ukraine. Germany planned to annex Ukraine together with Poland, Baltic States, Caucasus and other states to become the mightiest empire in the world. In the same way, Russian Empire wanted to annex Western part of Ukraine (Galicia) from Austro-Hungarian Empire (Figure 4).

In our opinion the period of the World War I had a significant impact on the formation of Ukrainian geopolitics, because of the following reasons:

1. Due to its geopolitical location Ukrainian territories became the main battleground between the Russian Empire and Germany. It was resulted in the enormous human losses and decrease in the economic development.
2. Ukrainian population was divided on two parts: Galicians, who supported the Habsburg Empire, and the rest of Ukraine, who were anti-Central Power supporters.

⁴⁶ Bohdan Nahaylo, p. 6.

⁴⁷ Richard Pipes, *The formation of the Soviet Union: communism and nationalism, 1917-1923* : with a new preface, Harvard University Press, 1997, pp. 10-11.

3. The growth of national consciousness among Ukrainians and the raise of “Ukrainian question” on the international level were opposed to increasing contradictions in the Russian Empire and the revolutionary inspirations among people.

4. October Revolution of 1917, which symbolized the end of tsarist Russian Empire, and the following uprisings in Ukraine gave a chance to create an independent Ukrainian People’s Republic in 1917 (Figure 5), which was renamed as Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1919.

The geopolitical and socio-cultural consequences of the World War I were more than just monumental. The end of German, Russian, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires brought a new political order on the map of Europe. In this case, Ukrainian leadership had to react on those changes and reorient their interests according to a new world’s geopolitical situation. The development of geopolitics of Ukraine as a founding member of the Soviet Union we will discuss in the following paragraphs.

2.2.The geopolitics of Ukraine in the Soviet era

After the break-up of the tsarist Russian Empire, a new-established Ukrainian government wanted to build multi-vector policy in the sphere of international relations pointed on the international recognition of Ukraine’s independence. A large number of diplomatic contacts with such countries as Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Switzerland, Poland, Finland, Sweden, were established since 1917. Ukraine actively participated in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of 1918, where affirmed own independence, signed numerous treaties with other states and conducted foreign policy according to the national interests.⁴⁸

In the same way Ukrainian leadership understood that geopolitical location of Ukraine, common history, culture and religion with the Soviet Russia made both of those states close in the foreign policy. Ukrainian Deputy People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs Mr. Yakovlev stated on August 1922 about the geopolitical interests: “Ukrainian diplomacy focuses on obtaining of the new government and establishing commercial relations with following countries – Czechoslovakia, Germany, Austria, Italy, and newly established Baltic States... In the same way Ukraine can not have

⁴⁸ James P. Nichol, *Diplomacy in the former Soviet Republics*, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1995, p. 91.

any interests other than in common with Russia... The heroic struggle of Russia, in complete Alliance with Ukraine on all fronts against imperialists is now giving place to an equally united diplomatic front".⁴⁹

The experience of the World War I and the threat of possible future wars forced Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to think about the formation of a military union with the Soviet Russia. Such Union was established between Ukraine and Russia to prevent any foreign interventions in 1919. Such countries as Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia joined Alliance in 1920-1921.⁵⁰

In the same time Moscow understood Ukraine's geopolitical importance and sought the ways for closer cooperation. It could be explained for the following reasons: Ukraine was the only European state, which bordered with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary; Ukrainian shorelines on the Black Sea could provide an easy access for Soviets to the international waters; By 1917 Ukraine had a population comparatively to that of France or Italy. Ukraine was the second most populous state within Russian Empire; Finally, Soviet Russia needed Ukraine because of its huge agricultural potential, mineral deposits and industrial power.⁵¹

The need to expand cooperation between two countries was met by Soviet Ukrainian government. Such newly-established Soviet states as Byelorussia and the Transcaucasian Federation also supported not only military, but also economic and political cooperation within a region. That is why, after the series of negotiations and other unification processes Ukraine as a founding member together with Russia, Byelorussia and the Transcaucasian Federation agreed to establish a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) on December 1922.⁵²

We should understand that development of geopolitics in the USSR differed from the development of geopolitics in the other countries. The Soviet leadership tried to forbid the formation of geopolitics, which was considered to be the element of Western capitalist civilization.

However, the period of the first years of Soviet era had a great influence on the development of geopolitics in Ukraine. For example, Ukraine has received great benefits during the first years in the USSR. The New Economic Policy of 1922 gave

⁴⁹ James P. Nichol, p. 91.

⁵⁰ Paul R. Magocsi, p. 526.

⁵¹ Raphael Shen, Ukraine's economic reform: obstacles, errors, lessons, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996, pp. 15-16.

⁵² L. G. Churchward, Contemporary Soviet government, Taylor & Francis, 1975, p. 79.

a big chance to rebuild the national economy damaged after the World War I. Ukrainian language and culture was widely promoted and recognized (which was forbidden under the tsars). That period was named as “Golden Age” for Ukrainian writers such as Mykola Khvylovy and Borys Antonenko-Davydovych, but also for hundreds of Ukrainians, who supported an idea of “Ukrainization”, a national idea to promote Ukrainian interests in all aspects.⁵³

The idea of national economy had to become a base for the future Ukrainian geopolitics. Protected national economy could help the development of regionally and socially limited base of Ukrainian culturalism and build the social infrastructure of Ukrainian economy. The ideas of a natural national “economic space” might be found in the works of famous Ukrainian geopoliticians Stepan Rudnytsky and Yuriy Lypa, who claimed that Ukrainian natural economy had two goals. First, it helped to set the image of common Ukraine’s interests over the ethno-linguistic and regional differences. Second, it provided a better understanding of a myth of prosperity via autonomy.⁵⁴ Stepan Rudnytsky and Yuriy Lypa argued that “Russian raw material and energy supply imposed unnatural diseconomies of scale on Ukraine, while exporting to Russia cut Ukraine off from geographically more proximate markets with lower transport costs. In short, welfare gains were predicted to accrue fairly rapidly after independence.”⁵⁵

The other famous Ukrainian academician Antin Sinyavsky focused his geopolitical research on geoeconomic problems of Ukraine. The professor Sinyavsky was actively involved in the development of Ukrainian geopolitical strategy in the sphere of economics. Speaking about the geopolitical role of Ukraine, he notes: "The transit route to the Mediterranean, India and the Far East goes through Ukraine."⁵⁶ A. Sinyavsky defined Ukraine's cooperation with the countries of the Middle East as strategically important. That region could become a big market for Ukrainian goods. Professor Sinyavsky became later a “father” of methodology of the Ukrainian economic geography. His economic theory of zoning became one of the first national geopolitical concepts. Antin Sinyavsky spend much attention

⁵³ Europa Publications Limited, *Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States*, Routledge, 1998, p. 853

⁵⁴ Robert Legvold, Celeste A. Wallander, *American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Swords and sustenance: the economics of security in Belarus and Ukraine*, MIT Press, 2004, p. 35.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ „Ukrainian geopolitics in the XIX – XX centuries“, Osvita.ua Web-page, Publications. Available at: <http://osvita.ua/vnz/reports/politolog/16294>, (Assessed on March, 5, 2011)

on studying of the world economy, which he considered as not a group of national economic systems of individual countries, but the complicated interconnected system.⁵⁷ We should mention that Antin Sinyavsky became one of the most prominent Ukrainian geopoliticians in the interwar period.

During the 1920s Ukrainian leaders of geopolitical thought were divided in two schools – statist and populist. Vyacheslav Lypynsky, a father of the statist school, rejected the ideas of populism and claimed that only some “mystical ideal” can motivate the masses to heroic exploits. In this case, the masses have to be led by the aristocracy. Lypynsky, saw societies going through three stages – the first, ochlocracy or social underdevelopment, the second – classocracy or high organic development, and the third is democracy or decline. Lypynsky supported an idea of the third stage ignoring its negative effect. He believed that there could be no state without nation. The base of Ukrainian state must be territorial, not ethnic or religious.⁵⁸

The ideas of Lypynsky were highly criticized for his single-minded insistence on the importance of the statehood for the development of Ukrainian nation. For example, Stepan Tomashivsky argued that statehood could not be the final goal for the national movement. Tomashivsky stressed on the fact that state it would be better for Ukrainians to stop pursuing the ideal of statehood, but develop the characteristic of modern nation.⁵⁹

Mykhailo Hrushevsky, the first Ukrainian president in 1918, one of the most prominent figures of Ukrainian national revival of the early XX century, a representative of populist school generally put the interests of masses at the top of agenda. However, Hrushevsky argued that confrontation between statists and populists was not about the issue of the statehood, but what kind of state they wanted to build. Lypynsky, Tomashevsky, Doroshenko, Krevetsky, and others rejected the idea of Hrushevsky about the orientation on masses: they stressed on the role of elites in Ukrainian history. In this case, we may conclude that confrontation was not

⁵⁷ „History of the world’s economic geography“, Geografica Portal – Publications. Available at: http://geografica.net.ua/publ/galuzi_geografiji/ekonomichna_geografija_zarubizhnikh_krajin/istorija_rozvitku_ekonomichnoji_geografiji_svit/64-1-0-839 (Assessed on March 6, 2011)

⁵⁸ Ilya Prizel, National identity and foreign policy: nationalism and leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 334.

⁵⁹ Serhii Ploky, Unmaking imperial Russia: Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the writing of Ukrainian history, University of Toronto Press, 2005, p. 331.

only between the statism and populism, but also elitism and anti-elitism or egalitarianism.⁶⁰

The death of Soviet leader Lenin in 1924 had an extremely negative effect on the development of Ukrainian geopolitical thought. The new leader Joseph Stalin had plans different from the previous administration. To keep stricter control on the parts of Soviet Union, including Ukraine was a main goal of the future dictator. During the 1920s the thousands of university teachers, thinkers, writers, students, Orthodox Church clergy and many others intellectuals or *intelligentsia*, who supported an idea of independent Ukraine were accused of trying to overturn Communist revolution and sent into exile in Siberia. Stalin also rejected any idea of national Ukrainian economic space by his ambitious plan to make the rural Soviet Union into the leading industrial power. During the 1920-1930s years many factories and mines were built in Ukraine. However, the widespread industrialization together with forced collectivization of the farms (giving up the private farms to the state-own collectives or *kolkhozy* lead to the uprising among Ukrainian farmers. To punish the farmers once and for all Joseph Stalin seized with force crop from the agricultural population and later sent the thousands of Soviet troops to strip the Soviet rural area of food. The result was shocking: more than 5 millions of Ukrainians starved to death in a massive man-made famine during the 1932-1933 years.⁶¹

The era of Great Terror by Stalin brought not only forced industrialization, collectivization, murders of people, who did not supported the communist ideology, but also increasing centralization of power in Moscow with the following destruction of all aspects of autonomy for Ukraine and its national interests. The number of intellectuals, philosophers, scholars and writers, including Serhiy Efremov, Volodymyr Chekhivsky, Andriy Nikovsky, Osyp Hermaize, Mykailo Slabchenko, Hryhoriy Holoskevych, and Liudmyla Starytska-Cherniakhivska were accused for the participation in the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, which supported the separation of Ukraine from the USSR, resistance of collectivization and assassination of Stalin. The organizations such as Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, Agricultural Academy, all-Ukrainian newspapers and magazines, and many other cultural, educational, scientific and religious institutions

⁶⁰ Serhii Ploky, p. 331

⁶¹ Jeffrey Zuehlke, *Ukraine in Pictures*, Twenty-First Century Books, 2005, pp. 29-30.

were totally destructed by political police NKVD. Ukrainian geopolitical ideology had a little chance for its development until Stalin was alive.⁶²

However, some of Ukrainian geopoliticians still continued writing of their works. For example, a famous Ukrainian political scientist, Yuriy Lypa published geopolitical works “Pryznachennia Ukrainy” [The Destiny of Ukraine] in 1938 and “Chornomorska Doktryna” [The Black Sea Doctrine] in 1940, where he described Black Sea doctrine of Ukraine and Ukrainian perspectives as a leader of the Black sea. Yuriy Lypa was one of the few researchers, who believed, that the main axis for Ukraine should be North-South, but now East-West. In his book “Pryznachennia Ukrainy”, the famous geopolitician defined the national idea of Ukraine and its place and role in the world’s history, and developed an idea of so-called “Ukrainian socialism”.⁶³ Yuriy Lypa also stressed on the importance of territory and the main rivers of Ukraine in the development of its geopolitics: “The river network of Ukraine creates the unity of territory, its trade, government, traditions, culture and religion”.⁶⁴

As we have mentioned in the previous paragraphs Stalin’s era was a very difficult time not only for the development of independent geopolitical thought, but also for all Soviet people. The actual reestablishment of independent Ukrainian geopolitical interests was recovered only after the end of World War II 1945 and the death of Stalin in 1953. The post-war period was remarkable in the sense of geopolitics. Ukraine returned its historical borders, grew its political and economic significance within the Soviet Union, for the first time in the last centuries Ukrainians received one, non-divided, single state. Historical lands of Western Ukraine were turned back from the polish state to Ukraine at Yalta conference in 1945, the Bessarabian districts of Northern Bukovina and Ismail (from Romania) and Transcarpathian Ruthian (from Czechoslovakia).⁶⁵

Following the death of Stalin in 1953, Nikita Khrushchev became a new leader of the USSR. Khrushchev, who was the First Secretary of the Ukrainian SSR during 1938-1949, knew the problems of Ukraine and actively supported its interests. Under leadership of Khrushchev, the Crimean peninsula (26 000 sq. km.) was

⁶² Orest Subtelny, pp. 417-420.

⁶³ „Yuriy Lypa“, Encyclopedia of Ukraine. Available at: <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/display.asp?AddButton=pages\L\Y\LypaYurii.htm> (Assessed on March, 9, 2011)

⁶⁴ Yuriy Lypa, *Pryznachennia Ukrainy* [Purpose of Ukraine], Lybid: Kiev, 2004, p. 2.

transferred from Russia to Ukraine in 1954. It made Ukraine the largest contiguous country on the European continent (Figure 6).⁶⁶

The transfer of Crimea to Ukraine was a big geopolitical shift in the relations between Russia and Ukraine. However, such “gift” was not so altruistic than it seemed. The first, historically the Crimean peninsula was a homeland for Crimean Tatars, who were expelled by Stalin during the World War II. That is why, Russians did not have a moral right to accept that territory. The second, the Crimean peninsula was naturally closer and economically dependant on Ukraine. The third reason, which is widely discussed by the modern Ukrainian geopoliticians, was to pass to Kiev a right to solve all that economic and political chaos, which happened after the deportations of Tatars in 1944.⁶⁷

The Khrushchev’s era or the period of de-Stalinization is often called in the history of Ukraine as “Thaw”, because it marked a new level in the development of Ukrainian economy, culture and politics. Ukrainian intelligence received a permission to publish own journals, magazines and dictionaries in the fields of history, language, geography and culture. At the same time Ukrainian scholarship did not concentrate only on the traditional humanities, but also developed modern areas of knowledge such as cybernetics, space engineering and nuclear research. In 1957 the first computer center was established in Kiev, later transformed in the Institute of cybernetics in 1962. The development of the above-mentioned fields of science made Ukraine a leader within the USSR. It was quite important for the redefining of national geopolitical interests in the close future.⁶⁸

In the 1950s Ukrainian leadership understood the importance of multidimensional foreign policy. Ukraine played the important role in the rebuilding of post-War world and establishment of the United Nations organization. We should mention that Ukraine, even while a Union republic, has received an exclusive right from the Soviet Union to be as a separate independent republic a full founding member of the UN in 1949, where Ukraine joined several specialized agencies and signed a plenty of the agreements and treaties related to the UN activities. Ukraine had joined other international and regional organizations, where mostly the Soviet

⁶⁵ Orest Subtelny, p. 481.

⁶⁶ „The transfer of Crimea“, International Committee for Crimea Official web-page. Available at: <http://www.iccrimea.org/historical/crimeatransfer.html> (Assessed on March, 10, 2011)

⁶⁷ Orest Subtelny, pp. 499-500.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 501.

Union as a union was also a member. That fact was widely recognized by the foreign states. Such countries as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria Yugoslavia, Cuba, India, Egypt, and others launched their consulates in Kiev or Odessa by the mid of 1970s.⁶⁹

Since the end of 1950s of the XX century Ukrainian foreign policy focused on the promotion of peace and security of peoples, the peaceful coexistence of independent sovereign countries and respect of the right for self-proclamation among all nations. Such intensions and active work within the United Nations were resulted in the establishment of the permanent representation of the Ukrainian SSR in the UN in 1957. As a member of the UN the republic paid a significant attention to the problems of post-wars outcomes. At the XII session of the UN General Assembly in October, 1957 the Chairman of Ukrainian delegation Mr. Palamarchuk claimed about the problem of disarmament – complete ban of nuclear and hydrogen weapon and reduction of the armed forces would prevent the possibility of future wars.⁷⁰

Analyzing the socio-cultural life of Soviet Ukraine we should mention in the late of 1950s and early 1960s Ukraine felt some cultural renaissance, but political repressions still occurred. On the one hand many writers and academicians were rehabilitated, new Ukrainian journals and newspapers were launched, but on the other hand, Ukrainian KGB (Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti [Committee for State Security]) continued its persecutions. The response of Soviet authority on such freedom inspirations was quick. A new doctrine of *slianie* (the blending of the nationalities within the USSR into one Soviet people) was launched to deflect anti-Russian mood of Ukrainian nationalists. The number of members of the United Party for the Liberation of Ukraine were arrested and sentenced. The Ukrainian Church was also forbidden. For example, the historic heart of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, the Kiev Pecherska Lavra monastery was declared as unsafe and closed. The archbishop of Chernihov and many others were sentenced to the prisons. The political arrests and persecutions forced Ukrainian intelligence to immigrate to the other countries and continue its work abroad during 1960s-1970s. Plenty of Ukrainian newspapers, schools, non-profit scientific and cultural organizations were launched in the other

⁶⁹ James P. Nichol, *Diplomacy in the former Soviet Republics*, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1995, p. 92.

⁷⁰ „Ukraina v systemi mizhnarodnykh vidnosyn [Geopolitics Ukraine in the system of international relations]“, SLV.com.ua. Available at: <http://slv.com.ua/bookz/183/6460.html> (Assessed on March, 11, 2011)

states, such as Canada, Austria, USA, Brazil, Argentina, Australia, Czechoslovakia and others.⁷¹ The persecution of religious and other secular activists (Josyp Terelya, Vasyl Kobryn, Volodymyr Brovchenko, Dmytro Pavlychko, Borys Oliynyk, Lina Kostenko and many others) continued in the late 1970s.⁷²

The last years of Khrushchev and the early years of Brezhnev, the following Soviet leader, were characterized as the negative environment for the development of Ukrainian geopolitics. The increasing activity of Ukrainian political scientists, who supported an idea of sovereign independent Ukrainian state, was met by the Soviet leaderships as a danger. The Soviet state policy of *slianie* did not allow recognition of any other nationality or state than the USSR.

The Brezhnev's neo-Stalinism did not have such negative effect on Ukraine, as original Stalinism did. However, the geopolitical situation of Ukraine had faced with some changes. The first, Brezhnev's constitution of 1977 declared that the USSR is a socialist state of the whole people, not only the workers and peasants, but also and *intelligentsia*. It respected the rights of all the nations and nationalities within a country. The right of Soviet republics to secede from the Union played later an important role in the dissolution of the Soviet Union.⁷³

The other, Ukrainian dissidents still failed to unify around one national idea. Drawing on its historic roots, Ukrainian intelligence was divided on two distinct orientations: the first, identified with its leader Dziuba, challenged Moscow's political and economic policies as a violation of "Lenin standards", which were declared in the moment of the Soviet Union's formation, and the second, led by Valentyn Moroz, drew on the violent pro-Moscow integralist ideology. The two orientations, national communists and neo-integral nationalists, did not assist the establishment of national idea, but ideologically divided Ukraine. The famous Ukrainian geopoliticians Stepan Rudnytsky claimed that those orientations represented the two authoritarian traditions in the history of Ukraine during the Soviet era.⁷⁴

Overall, by the mid of 1980s Ukraine existed as a territorial-administrative unit with a modern society, its political elite and institutional organization. The

⁷¹ Ilya Prizel, pp. 347-350.

⁷² Paul Rober Magocsi, p. 663.

⁷³ Kataryna Wolczuk, *The moulding of Ukraine: the constitutional politics of state formation*, Central European University Press, 2001, p. 46.

⁷⁴ Ilya Prizel, p. 353.

increasing anti-Moscow reactions were even intensified under the new policy of open public space and *perestroika* (restructuring) initiated by Mikahil Gorbachev in 1985. Gorbachev understood the strong need in the modern reforms of political and economic structure of the USSR. The reforms were also referred to the cultural life in the Union. The number of nationalist informal groups, led by dissidents who were released from the Soviet prisons, extremely increased. Most of those organizations appealed Gorbachev to speed up the reforms in Ukraine. For example, The Popular Movement for Perestroika (Rukh) was established in 1989 to call for the reforms and revival of Ukrainian language and culture. The movement created an unprecedented mass political awaking and mobilization among all Ukrainian people.⁷⁵

The raise of political mobilization and national identity among Ukrainians and other peoples, an absence of effective economic and political reform within the USSR and the geopolitical shifts in Europe at the end of XX century provoked the stagnation of the Soviet Union. As a result the history of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics closed to the end. Ukraine, Russia and Belarus signed Belavezha Accords, which declared the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Ukraine has also received a unique chance to build the new geopolitics, which would respond the national interests of an independent European state.

2.3. The formation of a new geopolitical thought in Ukraine

For much of the world Ukraine as a state appeared in 1991 after the break-up of the Soviet Union. In fact Ukraine has been for millennia on the lands where it is. A new date declaration of independence in 1991 was only another successful trial of local elite to regain a political control of its territory. In 1995 the US President Bill Clinton mentioned that a new democratic state Ukraine was in the same way one of the Europe's oldest nations.⁷⁶

By regaining a control over own foreign policy Ukraine caused major changes in the system of international relations. The actions of Ukrainians, who voted for a domestic independence, had a far-reaching influence on the future geopolitical shifts. American analyst Zbigniew Brzezinski named Ukrainian declaration of independence as "One of the three most important geopolitical

⁷⁵ Kataryna Wolczuk, pp. 65-66.

⁷⁶ Marta Dyczok, *Ukraine: movement without change, change without movement*, Routledge, 2000, p. 10.

development of the XX century ... The other two were the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918 and the 1945 division of Europe on two blocks.”⁷⁷

Canadian specialist on the former Soviet Union Dr. Marta Dyczok wrote: “Ukrainian declaration of independence became the Soviet Union’s death certificate. Without Ukraine, Russia could not maintain control over the other Republics, its direct influence pushed back into its own boundaries.”⁷⁸ Ukraine was a heartland, the home of several key industries and the breadbasket for all the Soviet Union, the nurturing place for many Soviet leaders: Kaganovich, Khrushchev (born near Kursk, but lived and died in Ukraine), Brezhnev, Shcherbytsky, and others. Ukraine was one of four founding members of the USSR and one of three (including Russia and Belarus), who signed Belavezha Accords, which declared the final dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Ukrainian capital Kiev was respected by many Russians as the integral part of the birth of their history and the center of the medieval principality of Kievan Rus.⁷⁹

Ukraine chose own path since gaining own independence. The foreign policies of two presidents (Leonid Kravchuk 1991-1994, and Leonid Kuchma, 1994-2005) declared “Returning to Europe” as the main geostrategic course in the national foreign policy. This course included the close interaction between the domestic reforms, national identity, and foreign policy orientation. Another policy, set by the political elites under the Kuchma’s leadership in 1994, was called as the “Cooperation independence”. That policy allowed Ukraine to normalize the strategic relations with Russian Federation and other neighbor countries, maintain the relations with the Eurasian states, but in the same time to continue its “returning to Europe”. Such policy had to endure the West to support Ukrainian economic and political reforms, convince the partners in the stability and security of the state.⁸⁰

Confirming the status of the peaceful European state Ukraine declared its new geopolitical model and its non-nuclear position. On that time Ukraine was the third largest nuclear power in the world (after the USA and Russia, but before China). Ukraine possessed a nuclear potential, in the total of 176 SS-19 and SS-24

⁷⁷ Marta Dyczok, p. 3.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ David R. Marples, *The collapse of the Soviet Union, 1985-1991*, Pearson Education, 2004, p. 109.

⁸⁰ Jan Zielonka, Alex Pravda, *Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe: International and transnational factors*, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 469.

intercontinental ballistic missiles (1240 warheads), 44 strategic bombers and unspecified number of tactical nuclear warheads on its territory.⁸¹

It is an interesting fact that most of those missiles were targetted on the United States. It was explained by the hostile relations between the USA and USSR during the Cold War and geostrategic location of nuclear arsenal in the European part of the Soviet Union. That is why, the USA seriously concerned about the nuclear status of Ukraine and actively supported its non-nuclear position. The US Secretary of Defence William J. Perry decribed a nuclear arsenal of Ukraine as „the single biggest threat to international peace and security that we face everywhere in the world“⁸². Today we may only wonder how Americans could describe their own nuclear potential and regular „human interventions“ into the other parts of the world to protect democracy.

Anyways Ukraine signed and ratified the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Armes (START I) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to confirm its non-nuclear status in 1994.⁸³

Ukrainian government understood that denuclearization required additional security guarantees from the global powers. After the long process of negotiations Ukraine received these assurances from the US and Russian presidents at the CSCE meeting in Budapest on December, 1994. The Budapest Security Assurances included the security and economic assurances from Russia and USA. In addition other nuclear states such as the Great Britain, China and France also provided the same assurances about Ukrainian security.⁸⁴ Ukraine has received a chance for democratic development in a new status – status of peaceful non-nuclear European state.

However, modern Ukrainian geopoliticians differently evaluate the desire of Ukraine to give up its nuclear arsenal. Some of them think that it was a big mistake to declare its non-nuclear status. The current anarchic system of international relations is not always based on the principals of international law. The security assurances received by Ukraine from the worlds power can not provide the feeling of

⁸¹ „Ukraine“, Nationmaster. Country Encyclopedia. Available at:

<http://www.nationmaster.com/country/up-ukraine/mil-military> (Assessed on March 13, 2011)

⁸² Anders Åslund, How Ukraine became a market economy and democracy, Peterson Institute, 2009, p. 39.

⁸³ Margarita Assenova, CSIS Eastern Europe Project, The debate on NATO's evolution: a guide, CSIS, 2003, p. 58.

⁸⁴ Roman Popalyuk, American – Ukrainian Nuclear Relations, DIANE Publishing, 1996, p. 55.

full security and stability. In addition, the nuclear potential could make Ukraine not the regional, but a global power in the close future. The status of global power could help Ukraine to confirm its non-alliance status and receive an effective tool to protect its geopolitical interests. Other group of political scientists think, that the nuclear status is a big responsibility and threat to the security situation in Europe. Ukraine as the state, which declared the democratic way of development and its Euro-Atlantic aspirations, has a chance to become the stable and strategic partner in the eyes of West, but not a hostile country of the former Soviet Union.

However, we personally think that Ukraine had to keep and develop its nuclear potential as the effective instrument of national geopolitics. The nuclear potential would make regional states to respect Ukrainian national interests and help to build exclusively mutual geostrategic relations with the countries of NATO and European Union. That is why, we have a strong interest that nuclear program of Ukraine will be renewed in the close future.

At the same time we are sure that Ukrainian integration to the Euro-Atlantic structures would shift the geostrategic balance of Europe, ending the imperial ambitions of Russian Federation to create the “Slavic Union” together with Ukraine and few other states of the former USSR. Such Union could restore the Soviet hegemony on the continent and threaten the security and stability in the region. However, as Zbigniew Brzezinski argued that without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a European power.⁸⁵

Ukrainian geopolitics started to develop separately from Russia after the Orange revolution. For Russia the Orange revolution of 2004 in Ukraine was much more serious threat than the Rose revolution in Georgia. Ukrainian Orange revolution inspired hope both in Ukraine and the West that Ukraine had chose the course of Western integration in the democratic development of state. Ukrainian revolution did not give so quick effect that it happened in other post-communist states. Personal rivalries between the two main leaders of the Orange revolution – the President Viktor Yushchenko and the Prime-Minister Yulia Tymoshenko negatively

⁸⁵ William Engdahl, „Washington Interest in Ukraine:US Intervention for 'Democracy“, Studien Von Zeitfragen web-page. Available at: <http://www.studien-von-zeitfragen.net/Zeitfragen/Ukraine/ukraine.html> (Assessed on March, 14, 2011)

influenced on the implementation of reforms and closer integration into the Euro-Atlantic institutions.⁸⁶

However, we personally believe the Orange revolution had positive rather than negative effect. The first, Ukrainian people were united around one national idea – better future for own country. The second, Ukraine as one of the largest European democracies confirmed its democratic status in the eyes of Western world. The negative outcome of revolution is only one – the leaders of Orange revolution Viktor Yuschchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko appeared to be a great disappointment in the eyes of millions of Ukrainians, who supported them. In the struggle for the power the leaders forgot about the supporters and did not implement the promised reforms.

Geographically and culturally Ukraine belongs to the European civilization. That is why, today Ukraine has to develop the strategy, which would respond the geopolitical potential of Ukraine as a Central European state. Historically, the parts of Ukrainian land developed within other countries such as the Moscow Empire, Austro-Hungarian Empire, Poland or Germany. However, today as an independent state, Ukraine has received a chance to build a fundamentally new geopolitics for the successful development of the Ukrainian people. The current formation of Ukrainian geopolitics requires a taking into account the combined system of geopolitical interests of other democratic civilized states, their experience and geopolitical concepts to develop own national strategy.⁸⁷

We should admit that many researchers work on the development of the most optimal geopolitical strategy for Ukraine. However, the process to find an “ideal” model of Ukrainian geopolitics is quite complicated and long-lasting. The cultural, historical, geographical, economic and other factors influence the modern geostrategy of Ukraine. Analyzing these factors the government-based the National Institute for Strategic Studies (Kiev, Ukraine) in the report “Ukraine in Core of Geopolitical Outlines” defines such main paradigms as “Eurasian (Russia and the CIS) paradigm, the Euro-Atlantic (European) paradigm and the South-Eastern paradigm... All of them have sufficiently deep historical roots and are determined by

⁸⁶ F. Stephen Larrabee. “Rethinking Russia : Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe: The Return of Geopolitics”, Journal of International Relations, Columbia University. Available at: <http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/russia-ukraine-and-central-europe-return-geopolitics> (Assessed on March, 15, 2011)

a number of geopolitical factors. This attests to their objectivity and importance for the existence of the state. They are traditional for political life of Ukraine... The strategic choice of partners was the first step of Ukraine was forced to do each time it has obtained the possibility of going its own way. With the regaining of independence Ukraine must once again express itself in this sphere. Public sentiment is torn in a severe struggle between the proponents of western and north-eastern directions for Ukraine. The identification of Ukraine's national interest in this issue constitutes a strategic choice, one that will influence the fate of the country for decades to come. In our opinion, the geopolitical situation of Ukraine demands the creation of a balanced system of neighborly relations.”⁸⁸

Analyzing these paradigms due to the terms of classical geopolitics Eurasian model is based on the “tellurocratic principle”.⁸⁹ According to Karl Schmidtt’s element theory the geopolitical cultural dualism is divided on two civilization types: talassocracy and tellurocracy. Schmidtt argues that geopoliticians make a significant error by the reducing the difference between the types of civilizations to differences in the geopolitical characteristics of given locality. Due to the tellurocracy, which is reflected in the basic principle of Eurasian model of Ukrainian geopolitics, states are defined as “the inner-continental civilizations, which are regarded as a “stationary platform,” “heartland,” or “geographical axis of history,” in that they remain stable and immobile in history. Meanwhile, civilizations of the former type, the coastal zones of the Eurasian mainland, are zones of intensive cultural development. For tellurocracy the main thing is not values but ideas being part of a solid ideology and the latter playing a system-forming role... Ideas and ideologies are the key elements of the Eurasian civilization whose geopolitical space is connected with Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe.”⁹⁰

The second paradigm of Ukrainian geostrategic model is Euro-Atlantic based on the talassocracy. The main values of talassocracy are marine power, the right to live, market relations, individual initiative and ethical flexibility. The values are focused on the life strategies to prove on the positive individual development. The

⁸⁷ „Ukraine in Core Geopolitical Outlines“, The Institute for National Strategic Studies. Publications. Available at: http://old.niss.gov.ua/book/engl/006_1.htm (Assessed on March, 15, 2011)

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Serhiy Datsiuk and Volodymyr Hranovsky, Humanitarian Technologies Agency, „Ukraine: Eurosiansism and Atlantism“, Den’ [The Day] The Day weekly digest. Available at: <http://www.day.kiev.ua/290619?idsource=252619&mainlang=eng> (Assessed on March, 17, 2011)

modern processes in Ukraine could be described as the movement towards a talassocratic civilization. By choosing talassocracy Ukraine simply renews its age-old historical status, which starts at the period of Kievan Rus. For Ukraine this choice is natural; it wants to regain its historical memory, the period when Ukrainian nation existed long before the Muscovy and the Slavic unions, the period of Kievan Rus. The culture of Kyiv Rus was talassocratic. The state with its powerful geopolitical influence lived for the centuries and developed ideas of individualism, enterprising spirit, possession of individual values, and introduction of law system. The identification of Kievan Rus as a talassocratic state is also explained by the development its maritime influence and strong influence of its strategic partners Greece and the Byzantine Empire. That is why, the Crimea peninsula and the access to the Black and Asov Sea is important for Ukraine not only in the geopolitical sense, but also cultural aspects.⁹¹

The last third paradigm of Ukrainian geostrategy, defined by the National Institute for Strategic Studies, is called South-Eastern. This model is characterized by its historical connections with the states of South-East. It also applies the principle of the frontier, the seashore line, the geopolitical location of Ukraine on the crossroads between Europe and Asia.⁹²

In my opinion all the above-mentioned paradigms have the right for existence. However I would not say that country has to follow only one of these concepts. Each may provide Ukraine a chance to develop the mutually beneficial cooperative relations with other regional states. That is why, we think that the “ideal” version for Ukrainian geopolitics would be the harmonious combination of all these paradigms into one complex national doctrine. Before we conclude with our version of the most optimal model of Ukrainian I think we should summarize the core geopolitical interests of Ukraine in the modern era. The role of interest in the formation of national geopolitics we explored in the first chapter of our thesis. The report of the National Institute for Strategic Studies “Ukraine in Core Geopolitical Outlines“ includes the following geopolitical priorities of Ukraine:

⁹¹ Serhiy Datsiuk and Volodymyr Hranovsky, Humanitarian Technologies Agency, „Ukraine: Eurosiansism and Atlantism“, Den' [The Day] The Day weekly digest. Available at: <http://www.day.kiev.ua/290619?idsource=252619&mainlang=eng> (Assessed on March, 17, 2011).

⁹² „Ukraine in Core Geopolitical Outlines“, The Institute for National Strategic Studies. Publications. Available at: http://old.niss.gov.ua/book/engl/006_1.htm (Assessed on March, 15, 2011)

- To provide the protection of Ukraine as a sovereign independent state; to assist the strengthening of the fundamental values, rights and freedoms to ensure stability, welfare, security and socio-cultural progress through the international cooperation;
- To conduct the policy pointed on Ukraine's "Return to Europe" through the integration into European and Euro-Atlantic political, social structures and security structures;
- To strengthen the economic, political and military potential of Ukraine through the intensification of domestic development, cooperation with other states within the framework of European security structures, conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements and treaties;
- To orient toward more closer integration into the European Union and the Western European Union; the comprehensive partnership with NATO, including the future possible membership in the political structures of this organization
- To build the strategic partnership with the USA and other western European countries in correspondence with national interests and priorities of Ukraine;
- To develop equal and mutually beneficial economic, political and socio-cultural relations with the Russian Federation and other states of former Soviet Union;
- To consolidate the special relations with strategically important neighbors, such as the Baltic states, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and states of the Visegrad group (Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary);
- To form mutually beneficial relations with the countries of North and South America, Asia, Africa and the Pacific region.
- To support the activities of Ukrainian Diaspora; to establish Ukrainian cultural, educational, scientific, economic and political centers abroad to extend the history, culture, language and other information about Ukraine;
- To assist the formation of so-called "stability belt" from the Baltic and Black Seas to the Caucasus and Central Asia through the active participations in the regional and global security, organizations;
- To participate in the development of the following "transportation corridors", which would link Europe and Eurasia, the "Baltic - Black Sea - Middle East",

the "Western Europe - Ukraine - the Transcaucasian - Central Asia - China" for the supply of energy and other strategically important resources; to modernize the national transportation system;

- To continue the course toward alternative leadership within the territories of the former Soviet Union; cooperation with those states that regard Ukraine as a reliable, equal partner, free of superpower and hegemonic ambitions;
- To prevent the attempts of any foreign socio-cultural and informational domination over the national culture and informational sphere;
- To develop all the pre-conditions for the development consistent national strategy that could react on new geopolitical and foreign policy interests, global challenges and the problems;⁹³

As we can see from the report Ukraine has a wide spectrum of geopolitical interests. The unique geographical location on the border of European and Eurasian civilizations opened for Ukraine the possibility for maneuver in the foreign policy. However, to achieve the ideal model for national geopolitics Ukraine has to develop its own multi-dimensional, pragmatic and non-aligned policy. Ukraine should closely cooperate with Euro-Atlantic institutions, but also build mutually beneficial relations with its neighboring states including Russia. The uniting role of mediator in the relations between the Central and Eastern Europe, the Black Sea and the Baltic regions would be an ideal version for Ukrainian policy-makers. Except it, the active participation in the work of regional and global organizations will assist Ukraine to protect its national interests.

⁹³ „Ukraine in Core Geopolitical Outlines“, The Institute for National Strategic Studies. Publications. Available at: http://old.niss.gov.ua/book/engl/006_1.htm (Assessed on March, 15, 2011)

3. The geopolitical position of Ukraine in a modern era: the relations with strategic partners

Due to its unique geopolitical location between the Slavic Eurasia and Western Europe Ukraine has a wide range of geopolitical interests not only within a region, but also outside this region. The main principles on which Ukraine develops its own foreign policy based on the respect of international law, the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe and other international documents.

Ukraine conducts an open multidimensional foreign policy, which is called to expand cooperation with all interested partners, and provide the protection of own geopolitical interests. In the same time Ukrainian government wants to build the relations with its strategic partners exclusively on the principles of voluntarism, mutual aid, mutual non-aggression, equality, mutual benefit, non-interference in internal affairs and peaceful coexistence.

The precondition for the analysis of the relations between Ukraine and its strategic partners is a clear understanding of the basic historical values, principals and interests of Ukrainian people, which were partly discussed in the previous chapter. For country, which fought for own independence for the long centuries, the question of sovereignty and territorial integrity, welfare of own citizens, respect to the human rights and main principals of international law define the aims Ukrainian geopolitics.

Historically Ukraine interacted with a plenty of geopolitical actors. Starting from the Kievan Rus and its first international treaty with Byzantium in 945⁹⁴ Ukraine formed own geopolitical strategy, which would respond to its geopolitical potential and possibilities.

Due to the geopolitical changes and shifts throughout the history Ukraine had to reorient not only its policy and interests, but also build the relations with different partners. It is quite complicated to explore the cooperation between Ukraine and all its partners. However, today we see it is important to analyze the strategic relations of Ukraine and other Central-Eastern European states, the United States of America (USA), the Russian Federation and the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The choice of the above mentioned geopolitical subjects

⁹⁴ Andrew Evans, Marc Di Duca, Ukraine, Bradt Travel Guides, 2010, p. 8.

may be explained by the historical past of Ukraine, the role of these states in the current globalization processes, and the personal motivations of the author. The time framework of the research is the period between the last proclamation of Ukraine's independence in 1991 and the present times.

3.1. Transformation of geopolitical position of Ukraine in the context of relations with the countries of Central-Eastern Europe

The independence of Ukraine in 1991 is often called as one of the most significant geopolitical developments since the collapse of the Soviet Union. An independent Ukraine seriously transforms the geopolitics of Europe, especially the Central-Eastern Europe (CEE). Zbigniew Brzezinski explained without Ukraine Russia could not become European superpower. Today present Ukrainian leadership declares its interest in the closer cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic institutions, especially the European Union (EU). In the same way Ukraine is actively involved in the development of the relations with other countries of the CEE, which are outside the EU.⁹⁵

From the first days of its independence in 1991 Ukraine actively develops the relations with the post-communist CEE states. These strategic relations have been seen in Kiev as crucial for its geopolitical interests. Ukrainian policy makers, historians and other specialists of the international relations develop the geopolitics of Ukraine as the state of Central Eastern Europe, not the Eurasia or the former Soviet Union state. It is explained by more than one thousand year history of Ukrainian nation, which starts from the Kievan Rus, the historical threshold for the Eastern European Slavic states, ethno-cultural characteristics and geographical location in the Center of Europe. It is an interesting fact that in 1887 the geographers of the Austro-Hungarian Empire calculated and set up a large marker defining the geographical center of Europe in the county of Rakhiv, Transcarpathian region, which is today a part of Ukraine (Figure 7).⁹⁶

After the collapse of Communism the Central Eastern European region has become one of the most dynamic on the continent. Due to their historical similarities, the CEE states share common interests and values. Most of those countries have

⁹⁵ F. Stephen Larrabee, United States. Air Force, NATO's eastern agenda in a new strategic era, Rand Corporation, 2003, p. 88.

⁹⁶ Dominique Auzias, Jean-Paul Labourdette, *Le Petit Futé Ukraine*, Petit Futé, 2009, p. 160

started the long process of building new democracies and market-oriented economics. Some of those states were successful in the reforms, others less, but all the CEE states realized they do not have a geopolitical future as a separate region, a “middle zone” between the Western Europe and Eurasia. The “return to into Europe” through the membership in such Western integrated institutions as the NATO and the European Union became one of the main goals in the geopolitics of each CEE state.⁹⁷

For the state, which borders with Russia and six more CEE states (Table 2), the development of the relations with neighbors is an effective tool to avoid the emergence of a new dividing line in Europe and exchange an experience of reform processes during the transition period. Due to the historical common past its borders with Russia are rather beneficial than threatening.⁹⁸

Ukraine has wide economic and military ties with Russia. In the same way the Russian Federation is the biggest energy supplier to the countries of Europe. We should mention that most of the CEE states 100% dependant on the Russian gas (Figure 8). Ukraine plays an extremely important role in the supply of Russian gas to the rest of European countries. The national gas transportation system of Ukraine supplies the neighbor and other European states with energy resources through the wide network of pipelines, which run thousands kilometers through Ukraine (Figure 9). Minister of Fuel and Energy of Ukraine Yuriy Prodan claimed at the briefing in the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine: “The Ukrainian gas transportation system is reliable, highly skilled workers operate it and it is capable both to provide completely the economy of Ukraine and fulfill a reliable transit of gas to the European states.”⁹⁹

We believe that Ukraine will effectively use its national gas transportation system to provide the protection of own geopolitical interests in the relations with other European states and become the key geopolitical player in the energy security and stability in the CEE region in the close future.

For Ukraine as the biggest regional CEE state the Central European dimension of its geopolitics has an especial meaning. Many countries in the Central Europe consider Ukraine as an important constructor of regional security. Some of

⁹⁷ Oleksandr Pavlyuk, “Enlargement and Ukraine’s Relations with other Central and Eastern European Countries”, NATO. NATO Publications, Available at: <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-00/pavliuk.pdf> (Assessed on March, 18, 2011)

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Yuriy Prodan, “Ukrainian gas transportation system is reliable”, Office of mass media relations of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Secretariat, The Government of Ukraine Official Portal. Available at: http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/publish/article?art_id=184830307 (Assessed on March, 20, 2011)

Ukrainian initiatives like its 1996 proposal for a nuclear-free zone in the CEE were called to prevent the deployment of nuclear weapon in the CEE states. In May 1996 The President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma said “Ukraine is speaking out for the territory of the countries supporting the Central European initiative to be free of nuclear weapons.”¹⁰⁰

In the report of the Ukrainian Institute for Strategic Studies the position of Ukrainian President was explained in the four reasons:

1. Today NATO and Russia deal only with regional conflicts, not superpower ones. According to the situation that appeared it would be more stable not to have nuclear weapon in Europe at all.
2. NATO Member-States, especially the United States, feel uncomfortable with the desires of some states in Eastern Europe to develop own nuclear weapons.
3. Due to the current geostrategic situation the Central European states, which want to get additional security guarantees, will not receive it outside the context of a CEE NWFZ
4. After the full withdrawal of Soviet troops from CEE in 1994, there is no any need for tactical nuclear weapons.¹⁰¹

The last twenty years proved that the stable development of Ukraine is directly linked to Euro-Atlantic integration. Ukraine should also continue to develop mutually beneficial relations with Russia. Economic and social reforms, openness and dialogue with the European Union are one of the main goals of a new Ukrainian government. It is a fact that Ukraine reached a big positive progress in the reforms for the last years. As a result Ukraine’s government is currently discussing the Free Trade Agreement and the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union (Table 3). Both of these documents are expected to be signed by the end of 2011.¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ Martin Kelly, “History of the proposal for a nuclear weapon free zone in Europe”, The official web-page of Nuclear Threat Initiative. Available at: <http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/ukraine/nwfz.htm> (Assessed on March, 22, 2011)

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Andriy Yermolaev, “In the Debate: The Ukrainian Transformation: Is a Third Way Possible?” – Easternpartnership official web-page. Available at: <http://www.easternpartnership.org/community/debate/ukraine-trying-catch-central-europe> (Assessed on March, 23, 2011)

For Ukraine the Free Trade Agreement with EU is not only chance to get an access to the market with more than 500 millions of consumers, but also a great success for Ukrainian geopolitics. Peter Mandelson, EU Commissioner for External Trade describe the benefits of Ukraine after the FTA agreement with EU: “It will lower the costs of EU imports for Ukrainian businesses and consumers, and increase Ukrainian access to the EU single market, , which is the largest in the world. It will improve the conditions for EU investments in Ukraine by creating clearer, more transparent and predictable rules... It will contribute to the extension of European production standards, sharply improving the competitiveness of Ukrainian producers in international markets, including the EU- the largest world market.”¹⁰³

In this case the strategic partnership with the CEE states is extremely important. Due to the similar post-communist history, cultural and ethnic similarities and mutually beneficial relations Ukraine expects to receive the full support of these states on the way to the FTA, Association Agreement with EU and further integration processes. Similarly to Ukraine the CEE states declared a desire to integrate to the Western economic and security institutions few years ago.

Ukraine respects the efforts of the CEE states to expand the regional cooperation through such organizations as the Central European Initiative, Central European Free Trade Agreement and the Visegrad Group. The cooperation with these organizations is one of the geopolitical priorities for Ukraine. For example, in June 1996 Ukraine joined the Central European Initiative, a group of 16 states of Central and South Eastern Europe, to expand the regional cooperation.

The participation of Ukraine in the regional CEE organizations is very important from the point of view of cooperation with states being in similar geopolitical situation. A good example of such organization is the Visegrad Group consisting of four CEE states – Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland. We should mention that this organization did not stop main activity after its members reached its main goal – entered the NATO and EU. This organization continues to expand the collaboration among its members. Ukraine as country which neighbors with three of V4 (Poland, Slovakia and Hungary) has a very close relations with organization. The annual meetings of the leaders, forums, intergovernmental

¹⁰³ Andrew Jeffrey, The Report: Ukraine 2008, Oxford Business Group, 2008, p. 18.

exchanges, different projects in the format “V4 + Ukraine” are the forms of such cooperation.¹⁰⁴

The participation of Ukraine at the last Summit of Heads of Governments of V4 countries as well as Germany and Austria, which was held in Bratislava on January, 2011, proved an interest in the development of regional cooperation. Speaking at the plenary meeting the Prime Minister of Ukraine Mykola Azarov said: “Ukraine is interested in the development of fruitful neighborly relations with all countries in Europe, especially with the Visegrad countries...This format is very successful and we are ready to actively promote cooperation... Ukraine, like all the Visegrad countries, is located in transit Carpathian region, which is promising in the context of transit projects”.¹⁰⁵

In this context the role of Ukraine in the transportation and energy sector is extremely important. The Visegrad countries are heavily dependant on Russian gas, which is transported through the gas transportation system of Ukraine. For example, Slovakia - 100%, Poland - 91%, Hungary – 90%, and Czech Republic – 74% are dependant on transported gas¹⁰⁶. The last disagreements between Ukraine and Russia in 2008-2009 on the cost of transit gas threatened the gas supplies to the V4 countries. For Russia own energy resources is an effective instrument of geopolitics. In this case Ukraine could become the main mediator in the relations with Russia. This kind of cooperation could strengthen the energetic security of the CEE region.

At the same time, the experience of the V4 countries towards the EU and NATO is very important for Ukrainian policymakers. V4 actively support Euro-Atlantic aspirations of new Ukrainian government and lobby its interests within EU. The military and peacekeeping cooperation is other sphere to develop. Annual joint military trainings and peacekeeping missions (Ukrpolbat, KFOR), utilization of missile fuel components (Ukrainian – Polish consortium) is a short list of such cooperation. Regional and transborder cooperation is an integral part of the relations between Ukraine and V4 states. Ukraine has two euro-regions with V4 countries –

¹⁰⁴ Nataliya Bets, “Ukraine and the Visegrad Group: achievements, problems and perspective of collaboration”, Faculty of political sciences and international relations, Matej Bel University. Available at: www.fpvmv.umb.sk/userfiles/file/4_2009/11_bets.pdf (Assessed on March, 25, 2011)

¹⁰⁵ “Ukraine is interested in enhancing cooperation with the Visegrad Group”, The Government of Ukraine - Department of Information and Communication of the Secretariat of the CMU – From 15.02.2011. Available at: http://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/publish/article?art_id=244065685 (Assessed on March, 25, 2011)

“Bug” (Ukraine, Poland and Belarus) and “Carpathian euro region”. The main goal of such especial regions is to develop friendly neighbor relations, exchange cultural contacts and intensify the investment policy in a region. Ukraine also cooperates with the V4 countries in the framework of AER (Assembly of European regions), CLRAE (Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe), AEBR (Association of European Border Regions) and three neighborhood programs: “Poland – Belarus – Ukraine”, “Hungary – Belarus – Ukraine” and CADSES (Transnational cooperation between Central Adriatic zone, Danube and the Central-Eastern Europe).¹⁰⁷

The International Visegrad Fund, founded in Slovakia in 2000, plays an important role in the socio-cultural cooperation between Ukraine and the V4 states. This Fund offers the scholarships for Ukrainian students and aspirants to study in one of V4 countries, grants for NGOs and universities to support democratic reforms and strengthen the cooperation between Ukraine and V4 countries.¹⁰⁸

Ukraine actively builds the strategic relations not only within the international organizations, but also with each state of a region. Ukrainian policymakers could refocus the relations with Poland, the state, which was historically characterized as hostile to Ukrainian people. In 1992 Ukraine and Poland signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, where both states renounced all territorial claims against each other and marked a new era in the relations between the two countries. Such rapprochement expanded the economic ties between Ukraine and Poland. The plan, offered by Ukrainian government, to transport the Caspian oil from Azerbaijan and Georgia through the national pipeline system “Odessa – Brody” (Sarmatia pipeline) to Gdansk (Poland) was highly supported by the Polish government. Two countries work together within a joint peacekeeping battalion “Ukrpolbat” in the international NATO and UN peacekeeping missions.¹⁰⁹

The last big project between two countries is “Ukraine – Poland UEFA Euro 2012”. Two states host the leading European football championship. For Ukraine, it

¹⁰⁶ “Energy security of Visegrad region”, Visegrad.info. The Portal of Visegrad. Available at: <http://www.visegrad.info/energy-security-infrastructure/factsheet/energy-security-of-visegrad-region.html> (Assessed on March, 27, 2011)

¹⁰⁷ Nataliya Bets, “Ukraine and the Visegrad Group: achievements, problems and perspective of collaboration”, Faculty of political sciences and international relations, Matej Bel University - www.fpmv.umb.sk/userfiles/file/4_2009/11_bets.pdf

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ F. Stephen Larrabee, United States. Air Force, NATO's eastern agenda in a new strategic era, Number 1774, Rand Corporation, 2003, pp. 107-108.

is not only a sport competition, but billions of the US dollars of investment in the transport, sport, tourist and other industries. The country has received the modern airports, roads, trains, hotels, stadiums and working places. This project is a great chance for Ukraine to promote its nation in the eyes of Europe as friend and partner.

Ukraine builds exclusively good-neighboring mutually beneficial relations with Slovakia and Hungary. It is quite natural that border countries wish to form the closest foreign policy, which would provide a peace and stability in a region. Ukraine has on its territory approximately 160 thousand Hungarians. Hungarian Government defined Ukraine as the country with the most appropriate conditions for inner consolidation of Hungarians. Ukraine, Hungary and Slovakia are post socialist countries which defined integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions and the establishment of the democratic society as the main goal of national domestic and foreign policy. Neighboring Ukraine, Hungary and Slovakia belong to the CEE region. These countries are interconnected with not only common regional military, ecological, transborder, socio-cultural and other interests, but, first of all, the economic development of the geostrategic European transit area, which includes the international automobile, railway and water transport routs within the states. Ukraine does not have any conflicts and problematic questions with Slovakia and Hungary. That is why, we can characterize the mutual relations with these states as close and friendly.¹¹⁰

The relations between Ukraine and Czech Republic are characterized as friendly. The diplomatic relations between Ukraine and the newly founded Czech Republic were established in January 1993, but the history of Ukrainian-Czech relations starts centuries ago. For example, the grand prince of Kievan Rus Vladimir the Great married to Bohemian woman Malfrida in the end of X century. Czech defeat at the Battle of White Mountain (Bila Hora) led to the major displacement of Czech people in central Europe.¹¹¹ The thousands of Czech families emigrated from the Czech lands mainly to the territory of modern Ukraine and few other states.¹¹² Hetman of Ukraine Pylyp Orlyk, who was born in a family of the first Czech

¹¹⁰ "The history of relations", The official web-page of Embassy of Ukraine to the Republic of Hungary – Publications. Available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.ua/hungary/en/26640.htm> (Assessed on March, 29, 2011)

¹¹¹ "Ukrainian – Czech relations", The official web-page of Embassy of Ukraine to the Czech Republic – Publications. Available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.ua/czechia/ua/15115.htm> (Assessed on March, 29, 2011)

emigrants, later became the author of one of the first state constitutions in Ukraine and all Europe.¹¹³

At present the relations between independent Ukraine and the Czech Republic are characterized by high level of collaboration in the political, economic and cultural spheres. More than 70 intergovernmental agreements and treaties form the legal base for the cooperation. It is an interesting fact that Ukraine joined the Council of Europe during the presidency of Czech Republic in this organization. The official visits of the Presidents of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma in 1995 and Viktor Yushchenko in 2009 to Czech Republic, and the Presidents of Czech Republic Vaclav Havel in 1997, and Vaclav Klaus in 2005 positively influenced on the mutual relations between two countries.¹¹⁴

According to the Concept of Foreign Policy of the CR, Czech Republic considers Ukraine as an important European country, on which stability in Central and Eastern Europe depends. Czech Republic supports Euro-Atlantic integration aspirations of Ukraine and will do everything possible to expand mutual beneficial cooperation. Czech Republic also claims that European Union should be open to all European states that meet the main criteria of EU.¹¹⁵

Analyzing the similar views on the main global problems two countries should continue the cooperation in the peacekeeping activities. The great example of such cooperation was common participation in the multinational stabilization force during the Iraq crisis. Ukraine and Czech Republic sent its military units to Iraq. Ukrainian airlift aircraft Antonov-124 "Ruslan" transported Czech military personnel and medical field hospitals to Kuwait and Afghanistan. Ukraine was one of the first countries, which sent the medical aid and drugs to Czech Republic to prevent the spread of infectious diseases after unprecedented floods in August, 2002.¹¹⁶

¹¹² "Czech immigrants of the swan valley", Czech Dialogue. Available at: <http://www.cesky-dialog.net/clanek.php?idcl=511&aidci> (Assessed on March, 29, 2011)

¹¹³ Books, LLC, Ukrainians of Czech Descent: Czech Expatriates in Ukraine, Pylyp Orlyk, Vclav Suk, Tom Hbschman, General Books, 2010 - Pages: 20, p. 4

¹¹⁴ "Ukrainian – Czech relations", The official web-page of Embassy of Ukraine to the Czech Republic – Publications. Available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.ua/czechia/ua/15115.htm> (Assessed on March, 29, 2011)

¹¹⁵ "The Concept of Foreign Policy of Czech Republic", The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Czech Republic. Available at: www.mzv.cz/public/32/2a/ac/14172_14945_ForeignPolicyII.doc (Assessed on March, 30, 2011)

¹¹⁶ "Ukrainian – Czech relations", The official web-page of Embassy of Ukraine to the Czech Republic – Publications. Available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.ua/czechia/ua/15115.htm> (Assessed on March, 29, 2011)

Other important fact is that the Czech Republic has on its territory approximately 132 thousand of Ukrainians.¹¹⁷ We should mention Ukrainians make the largest group of foreigners in the CR. Most of Ukrainians came from the Western parts of Ukraine in the early 1990s. The Government of Ukraine defined one of the main tasks in the relations with Czech Republic to create the conditions for inner consolidation of Ukrainians on the Czech territory and will do everything possible to protect the interests of its citizens.

In conclusion, the relations with Czech Republic and other CEE states and cooperation with regional organizations such as Central European Initiative and the Visegrad Group are strategically important for Ukraine. The strengthening of the ties with Mitteleuropa might help Ukraine in its Euro-Atlantic integration processes. The CEE states highly support the democratic reforms in Ukraine and actively promote the interest of Ukraine within EU. With the expansion of NATO and the EU and the inclusion of new members - the CEE states – the geopolitical situation of Ukraine has significantly changed. Ukraine became the direct neighbor of EU. The four of EU members border with Ukraine. That's why, we think the cooperation between Ukraine and other CEE states has a great potential for its development in the context of regional security and stability.

3.2.The United States – Ukrainian strategic relations

The history of relations between Ukraine and USA is often called as the “long road to strategic partnership”. During the Cold War Ukraine had a limited independent foreign policy, especially with the United States, which was considered to be hostile in the eyes of Soviet leadership. After the dissolution of the USSR twenty years ago the USA faced with a serious problem. American leadership was not ready to such geopolitical changes. With the search of new global role the United States had also to think how to deal with fifteen new states, including Ukraine, which appeared in place of a single one. For the US Ukraine was only a part of the Soviet Empire with the world's third largest nuclear arsenal. During the first years American leadership did everything possible to convince Ukraine to give up its nuclear weapon in exchange on the security guarantees and economic assistance. The

¹¹⁷ “Foreigners: by type of residence, sex and citizenship”, Czech Statistical office web-page. From - 31 October 2009. Available at: -[http://www.czso.cz/csu/cizinci.nsf/engt/8200578577/\\$File/c01t01.pdf](http://www.czso.cz/csu/cizinci.nsf/engt/8200578577/$File/c01t01.pdf) (Assessed on April, 1, 2011)

Chernobyl nuclear disaster of 1986, high costs on the keeping of nuclear arsenal and the desire of Ukrainian leadership to promote the state as the friendly non-nuclear European country closed Americans to its goal.

We should mention that the United States in 1991-1994 focused mainly on the relations with Russia and did not seriously develop the relations with other former Soviet states. However, the strategic review of the US foreign policy, great disappointment with Russia's performance (Russia alone is not the same as the USSR!) and the evolution of expert thinking about the post-Soviet space pushed a new American administration to cooperate with all Russia's post-Soviet neighbors, with a special position reserved for Ukraine.¹¹⁸

The following cooperation between two states was increasingly productive. The dialogues between Ukraine, Russia, and the United States on the nuclear issue lead to a trilateral agreement on nuclear energy and disarmament in January 1994. The non-nuclear status of Ukraine marked a new era in the relations between two countries. The US Government declared 1994 the "year of Ukraine" and claimed about the full support of democratic economic reforms. In 1996, the high-level Commission under the leadership of Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and the US Vice-President Al Gore stressed on the importance of bilateral cooperation and evaluated these relations to the level of a "strategic partnership."¹¹⁹

The security treaty and strategic partnership with the USA is very important in the context of Ukrainian geopolitics. The role of the United States as the global dominating power could be helpful in the reforming processes of Ukraine. Ukraine has also received a huge financial and technical assistance from the USA in the amount excided only by its funding of Israel and Egypt. The US – Russian relations became more strained after Russia's sales of weapon and nuclear reactor to Iran, improving China-Russia relations, and Russian attempts to intensify its control over the Caspian basin. In this case, by 1995 the relations with Ukraine had become an important part of the US foreign policy. Ukraine preceded Russia as a Member of the Council of Europe and the NATO's Partnership for Peace. Ukrainian contingent in the Balkans assisted the US President Clinton administration in the arming of Bosnia

¹¹⁸ Volodymyr Dubovyk, "U.S.-Ukraine Relations - The Long Road to Strategic Partnership", PONARS Policy Memo No. 424, The George Washington University. Available at: http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/pm_0424.pdf (Assessed on April 1, 2011)

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

as a part of the US strategy to build a well-armed Bosnian state. Unlike the period of previous Kravchuk administration when the official visits were rare and ineffective, Ukraine hosted not only the US President Bill Clinton, but also high cabinet officials, congressmen and military delegations. Ukraine also hosted a joint military training of the USA, Slovakia, Hungary, and Ukrainian troops in 1995.¹²⁰

However, we should mention that Ukraine and the USA have faced with some difficulties in the sphere of military and political cooperation in the following years. Ukrainian export of military technologies to China, Iran and Libya was not positively evaluated by the US Government. In addition the official Washington was disappointed with the level of economic reforms in Ukraine.¹²¹ Kuchmagate, a scandal surrounding a murder of Ukrainian journalist, Georgiy Gongadze, pressure on the independent media, Ukrainian arm sales to Macedonia and allegations that Kuchma approved the sale of four highly sophisticated radar systems “Kolchuga” to Iraq, seriously worsened the relations between Ukraine and the USA. The Ukraine–developed “Kolchuga” system was one of few in the world systems, which was able to detect the US “Stealth” aircraft and seriously threatened the US interests in Iraq. As a result the USA cancelled a financial aid and seriously reviewed its policy according to Ukraine. Even the Government of Ukraine had taken a plenty of steps to improve the situation, including the further sending of 1800 soldiers to help to stabilize Iraq, the relations remained problematic.¹²²

However, the US-led global war on terrorism required more support from other countries, including Ukraine, than American government expected before. Ukraine as the largest contiguous European state located on the crossroads between Western Europe and Eurasian Russia had a potential to play an important role in the global coalition in combating regional and global terrorism. Ukraine could contribute to the US campaign against terrorism in two ways. First, the consolidation of democracy would allow Ukraine to have one of the biggest European democratic armed forces and play important role in the security and stability in a region. Second, such role of Ukraine in the team of global coalition would give Ukraine the authority to play diplomatic role in the “frozen conflicts” between the former Soviet republics.

¹²⁰ Sharon L. Wolchik, Vladimir Zviglianich, *Ukraine: the search for a national identity*, Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, p. 25.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² F. Stephen Larrabee, *United States. Air Force, NATO's eastern agenda in a new strategic era*, Выпуск 1744, Rand Corporation, 2003, pp. 99-100.

That is why, the military transformation reforms together with democratization processes in Ukraine determine the level of cooperation with the USA in the struggle against terrorism.¹²³

The new elected government understood the importance of mutual cooperation in the war on terrorism in the context of Ukrainian – American relations. After the bomb attacks in London in July 2005 the leader of Orange revolution President Viktor Yushchenko claimed: “Terrorism is a common challenge for every country which requires a common solution.”¹²⁴

We should mention that with a new Orange administration the US – Ukrainian relations have seriously progressed compared to the epoch of previous Kuchma’s administration. The newly-elected leadership clearly declared its Euro-Atlantic integration aspirations. The meeting between the US President George W. Bush and the President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko in April 2005 marked a new era in the relations between two countries. Bush confirmed the US support for Ukraine’s future possible membership in the NATO and World Trade Organization (WTO).¹²⁵

Both Presidents declared the strategic format of bilateral relations and confirmed it the Joint Statement of Presidents of Ukraine and the USA. The US position to strengthen the relations with Ukraine lead to the signing of the Charter of the Strategic Partnership between two countries in December 2008. In the Preamble to the Charter Ukraine and the USA it is affirmed the importance of the relationship as friends and strategic partners. Both countries confirm the importance of the security assurances for Ukraine described in the Trilateral Statement by the Presidents of the USA, Russian Federation and Ukraine on January 14, 1994, and the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on December 5, 1994. The Charter consists of the sections, which relate to the principles of cooperation, defense and security cooperation, economic, trade and energy

¹²³ Deborah Sanders, Army War College (U.S.), Strategic Studies Institute, Ukraine after the Orange Revolution: can it complete military transformation, Strategic Studies Institute, 2006, p.1.

¹²⁴ Ibid, p. 2.

¹²⁵ Janusz Bugajski, Steven Pifer, Celeste A. Wallander, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, D.C.), Ukraine: a net assessment of 16 years of independence, CSIS, 2008, p. 11.

cooperation, strengthening democracy, increasing people-to-people contacts and cultural exchanges.¹²⁶

These documents provoked the fact that Ukraine and the USA started to hold regular meetings at the high-level. For example, the Ukrainian-American Strategic Partnership Commission was established to be the principal intergovernmental body, which aimed to implement the Charter and regulate bilateral coordination mechanisms. Other spheres of Commission's activities relate to the areas of economics and investment, energy and nuclear safety, nonproliferation and arms sales, science and technology, military cooperation and political dialogue. For Ukrainian geopolitical interests, the US recognition of Ukraine as a market economy is very important. This status allowed Ukraine to abolish Jackson – Vanik Amendment (adopted in 1974) and receive the US support of Ukraine's accession to the WTO. The US Government has also opened such important organizations as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the US Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine.¹²⁷

Ukraine and the USA signed also few more important documents to expand the legal base for mutual cooperation in the sphere of trade and investment cooperation, cooperation in science and technology and cooperation in the space research, memorandum on cooperation between the Ministries of Economy, Ministries of Health, cooperation in nuclear safety and others. In total Ukraine and the USA signed more than 120 bilateral documents.¹²⁸

The last important document, signed between Ukraine and the USA in March, 2008, is the Priorities for U.S.-Ukraine Cooperation (Road Map). The list of priorities includes:

1. Deepening Ukraine's integration in European, Euro-Atlantic and global institutions;
2. Strengthening the rule of law in Ukraine, promoting reform of the legal system, law; enforcement and security structures, as well as accelerating efforts to combat corruption and trafficking in persons;

¹²⁶ “United States-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership”, The US Department of State - Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs - Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Other Releases (2007-2009). Available at: <http://www.state.gov/eur/rls/or/142231.htm> (Assessed on April 3, 2011)

¹²⁷ “Past and present of Ukrainian – American relations”, The official web-page of Embassy of Ukraine to the United States of America – Publications. Available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.ua/usa/ua/24027.htm> (Assessed on April 3, 2011)

¹²⁸ Ibid.

3. Improving Ukraine's investment climate and promoting closer economic and commercial cooperation;
4. Building Ukrainian energy security, energy efficiency, diversification of sources and transparency;
5. Enhancing efforts to promote nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament goals;
6. Continuing Ukraine's defense and military transformation;
7. Exploring new areas for cooperation in high-technology, space and missile defense;
8. Continuing to work together toward resolution of the Transdnistrovia and other regional conflicts and to encourage the promotion of democracy in Belarus;
9. Developing regional organizations;
10. Enhancing bilateral cooperation through exchanges and visits;
11. Remembering the 1932-33 Holodomor (Great Famine) in Ukraine;
12. Combating HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis.¹²⁹

Analyzing the above-mentioned list of priorities we may conclude that the USA remains the key partner of Ukraine. The present Government of Ukraine considers the US as the important partner in the plenty of national projects in the sphere of energy, such as the production of energy from shale gas and coal bed methane, projects in the oil and gas on the Black Sea shelf, nuclear fuel production for Ukrainian nuclear power plants and nuclear safety projects for operating plants. From the point of geopolitical interests the enhanced cooperation with the USA may diversify the energy resources and avoid the dependence on Russian energy resources (gas and nuclear fuel).¹³⁰

We should mention that when the world faced with the world economic crisis the bilateral trade dynamic between Ukraine and the USA continued to develop. For example, the bilateral trade grew by 76% in 2010 and reached to the amount of 2426

¹²⁹ "Priorities for U.S.-Ukraine Cooperation (Road Map)", The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Official web-page. Available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.ua/mfa/en/news/detail/11920.htm> (Assessed on April 5, 2011)

¹³⁰ "Past and present of Ukrainian – American relations", The official web-page of Embassy of Ukraine to the United States of America – Publications. Available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.ua/usa/ua/24027.htm> (Assessed on April 3, 2011)

million dollars USA.¹³¹ The export of Ukrainian goods to the U.S. grew by 21% to 1082 million dollars. The imports of American goods to Ukraine increased by 51% and amounted to 1344 million dollars (Table 4). The USA remains one of the biggest investors for Ukraine. In 2010 Ukraine's economy received more than 1 billion 218 million US dollars of the US investments, which is 2.7% of all Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in Ukraine. In the same time Ukraine is a home for 1545 registered companies with the US capital. The most attractive areas for American investors are agriculture, trade, energy, and financial sector.¹³²

Ukraine and USA actively cooperate in the field of military collaboration, which is focused on the involvement of the US experience in the military reform in Ukraine, improvement of national Joint Major efforts in the field of military cooperation focused on the involvement of DOD capabilities to promote military reform in Ukraine, improvement of Joint Rapid Reaction Forces of Ukraine, national modernization of the military landfills, organization of joint military trainings and operations against international terrorism.¹³³

Ukraine as one of the world's top 10 states in the field of space exploration and aerospace industry is interested in the cooperation in science and technology with the USA. The President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich in his speech dedicated to the 90th anniversary of Ukrainian astronaut Georgiy Beregovoy's birth claimed: "I see our space achievements as a driving force of the country's development. Participation in space programs indicates technological capabilities, economic prospects and the level of national security of a state... Ukraine is one of the five countries in the world which have a complete rocket production cycle. Therefore, it requires us not to stop, but look for new ways to develop aerospace industry."¹³⁴ Analyzing the words of President we may conclude that cooperation with the USA in the sphere of aerospace engineering will continue its successful development. As an example of such cooperation is the realization of project "Taurus – 2", where Ukrainian state-owned aerospace design bureau "Yuzhnoye" jointly with

¹³¹ "Trade in Goods with Ukraine", The US Census Bureau - Census.gov - Business & Industry - Foreign Trade - U.S. International Trade Data. Available at: <http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4623.html> (Assessed on April 4, 2011)

¹³² "Past and present of Ukrainian – American relations", The official web-page of Embassy of Ukraine to the United States of America – Publications. Available at:

<http://www.mfa.gov.ua/usa/ua/24027.htm> (Assessed on April 3, 2011)

¹³³ Ibid.

its American partner Orbital Sciences Corporation develop a new space complex "Taurus-2" at the base of Ukrainian rocket carrier "Mayak". It is planned that "Taurus-2" will become the main expendable launch system designed to launch payloads into the space for the US Government.¹³⁵

The USA is the biggest partner of Ukraine in the nuclear research and security. At the last world's Summit on the Safe and Innovative Use of Nuclear Energy, which was held on April 19, 2011, in Kiev, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Head of the US Delegation, claimed: "Ukraine has clearly shown its leadership on nuclear security and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Not only Ukraine chosen this leadership role on reducing the chances of nuclear terrorism, but Ukraine has chosen a path towards the peaceful use of nuclear technology. As Ukraine's ally and strategic partner, the United States is proud to be a part of these efforts, and proud to have helped the people of Ukraine over the past quarter century. The United States is committed to completing the Chornobyl projects and converting the damaged reactor site to an environmentally safe and secure condition."¹³⁶ We should mention that the USA became the biggest donor of the Foundation "Shelter", an organization, which is collecting money for the safety upgrading program at the Chernobyl nuclear station, after the Summit. The amount of grant was 360 million of the US dollars.¹³⁷

People-to-people contacts, cultural exchanges, the cooperation between the cities of Ukraine and the USA and support of Ukrainian citizens on territory of the USA are another important task of Ukrainian geopolitics. The USA as a multinational state is a home for a large community of Ukrainians. Over 890 thousands of Ukrainians live in the USA. The Government of Ukraine actively cooperates with the United States to protect the interests and rights of its citizens, help Ukrainian Diaspora to promote its ethnic and cultural needs. Through the Ukrainian National Information Service (UNIS), which is the Ukrainian American

¹³⁴ "President: I will do everything for the development of rocket-space industry in Ukraine", The official web-page of Embassy of Ukraine to the United States of America, April 16, 2011. Available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.ua/usa/en/news/detail/57063.htm> (Assessed on April 20, 2011)

¹³⁵ "Past and present of Ukrainian – American relations", The official web-page of Embassy of Ukraine to the United States of America – Publications. Available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.ua/usa/ua/24027.htm> (Assessed on April 3, 2011)

¹³⁶ "Remarks by the U.S. Head of Delegation Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski at the Kyiv Summit on the Safe and Innovative Use of Nuclear Energy, April 19, 2011", The Embassy of the United States, Kyiv, Ukraine, 04.19.2011. Available at:

<http://ukraine.usembassy.gov/remarks-brzezinski-summit3.html> (Assessed on April 22, 2011)

¹³⁷ Ibid.

community's public relations office in Washington DC, the support of Ukrainian and American governments an effective tool of such cooperation the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA) was created in 1997.¹³⁸

The UCCA is a group of Members of the US Congress (more than 40 Congressmen), who take an interest of Ukraine and actively work to promote better Ukrainian – American relations. The UCCA in the cooperation with the Ukrainian American community is a valuable source of information for the rest Congressmen about the current situation in Ukraine. The main functions of the UCCA are:

- Coordination and consolidation of development of organized Ukrainian life in the USA and support of Ukrainian American community in the civic and cultural life of the country
- Representation of the Ukrainian American community before the governmental structures of the USA
- Promotion of Ukraine and the Ukrainian nation in the eyes of Americans and provide all possible support for the consolidation of an independent and democratic Ukrainian state
- Promotion of Ukrainian nation among nations as a equitable and friendly member of the family of sovereign nations
- Providing assistance to the Ukrainian nation through cooperation with private and governmental organizations
- To assist, support and cooperate with the United States government in creating an equitable world order
- In order to accomplish its goals, the UCCA has the following instruments: loyal cooperation with government authorities in their policies, obtains government contacts through consultation and correspondence with lay and religious organizations, publication of the relevant materials including press releases, journals books and other papers, collects and archives
- Documentation on the participation of Ukrainians in the activities of the USA.¹³⁹

¹³⁸ “Past and present of Ukrainian – American relations”, The official web-page of Embassy of Ukraine to the United States of America – Publications. Available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.ua/usa/ua/24027.htm> (Assessed on April 3, 2011)

¹³⁹ “Mission”, The official web-page of Ukrainian Congress Committee of America. Available at: <http://ucca.org/en/about-us/mission> (Assessed on April, 25

The successful cooperation between Ukraine and USA during in the last years created a solid base for further development of bilateral strategic partnership. The main geopolitical interests of Ukraine in the relations with the USA are the development of democracy, assistance in economic and political reforms, military, transport, energy and scientific cultural cooperation. For Ukraine the strategic partnership with the USA is especially important. Only the USA is powerful enough to counter the strategic weight of the global powers such as neighboring Russia with its little, but still imperialist ambitions, extremely growing China or the potential threat from the hypothetic union of Islamic states. In this case, we believe that the further strengthening of the mutual relations between Ukraine and the USA will be a key issue in the geopolitical doctrine of Ukraine.

3.3. Geopolitical interests of Ukraine in the cooperation with Russian Federation and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought unprecedented changes that cardinally reshaped the world geopolitics and ended the long-lasting system of bipolar system of international relations. The former countries of the USSR, including Ukraine, felt the impact of that event to the highest degree. The recent civil upheavals and revolutions in the post-Soviet area were the outcomes of what former Russian President Vladimir Putin called “The greatest political catastrophe of the century.”¹⁴⁰

The break-up of the USSR became a big “surprise” not only for people, but also for the policy-makers of the new established states. The long tradition of common history within a Soviet Union pushed the leaders of those countries to create the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Such creation could help new states to adapt easier to a new geopolitical situation and provide the base for the following cooperation.

That is why, the leaders of eleven former Soviet republics agreed to create a new regional intergovernmental organization the Commonwealth of Independent States with a headquarter in Minsk, Belarus. The Charter of the CIS and the Protocol on Establishment of the CIS were signed on December 21, 1991 and marked the beginning of a new history for all those states. Ukraine similarly to other former

¹⁴⁰ Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, Rouben Azizian, Islam, oil, and geopolitics: Central Asia after September 11, Rowman & Littlefield, 2007, p. 257.

Soviet countries felt more secure to cooperate among the brother states than with outsiders. In the same time the CIS was not the supranational organization, it was rather forum to discuss the problems, related to the social and economic reforms in the new states. The membership in the CIS did not prevent the cooperation with other regional and international organization. Except it Ukraine as a member of the United Nations organization since 1945 wanted to keep its own sovereign geopolitical interests.¹⁴¹

One of the issues, the new established organization had to solve, was the external debt of the Soviet Union. As the USSR broke up, the US Treasury had one concern to make sure that all the republics have a joint responsibility to serve the debt. However, Russian leadership understood that it would not be possible. They offered to take over all the debt on the conditions they would receive all the Soviet assets. All the former Soviet states, except Ukraine, agreed on such offer. The government of Ukraine suspected that Russia was cheating and demanded to show all the accounts of the Soviet assets. Russia was not able to provide any documents. After the long-lasting discussions about the Soviet external debt Ukraine finally agreed to recognize Russia as the USSR successor. For Ukraine this agreement was highly beneficial. The state received a chance to start own national development without the external debt.¹⁴²

Ukraine considers the CIS as the framework to expand its economic and trade ties with a new independent states. However, the CIS Agreement on the Creation of Free Trade Zone in 1994, which was called to form the base for the Free Trade regime among the states, was not ratified by Russia. The absence of conflict-solving mechanisms within a framework of the CIS forced the states to establish bilateral agreements between the countries and did not count on the CIS. The trade, economic and organizational system of the CIS was inefficient.¹⁴³

As a result five years later Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma said at the summit of the CIS presidents: “I am clearly and fully aware that a shapeless organization, like the CIS has no future”¹⁴⁴ Later Ukrainian leader named the CIS as

¹⁴¹ Curtis F. J. Doebbler, *Introduction to International Human Rights Law*, CD Publishing, 2006, p. 74.

¹⁴² Anders Åslund, *How Ukraine became a market economy and democracy*, Peterson Institute, 2009, p. 38.

¹⁴³ *Ibid*, pp. 38-39.

¹⁴⁴ Mikhail A. Molchanov, *Political culture and national identity in Russian-Ukrainian relations*, Mikhail A. Molchanov, 2002, p. 265.

a “purely consultative body” and refused to participate in the reforms of its structures. Ukrainian geopoliticians claimed that the CIS was not the institution to protect the national interests. The sovereigntists argued that the possibility of the renewal of “supranationalism” within the CIS might threaten the independence of Ukraine. However, we should mention that Ukraine did not quit its membership in that organization.¹⁴⁵ It can be explained by the desire of Kiev to continue the cooperation in the sphere of culture, education, transport and energy resources.

We may observe that since 1992 Ukrainian leadership plays a “balancing role” in the region, both within and outside the CIS. Kiev refused to participate in any CIS security treaties in order to counterbalance Russian domination in the CIS and its plans to turn it to the military union in the future. Ukraine considers the CIS, as the union of two blocks of countries. The first, led by Russia, is composed of Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan and few other states, and other block, led by Ukraine, consists of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Moldova and Georgia, the states who support Ukraine’s desire to play a counter-balance role within the CIS. The establishment of an informal Georgia – Ukraine – Azerbaijan – Moldova (GUAM) group with the office in Kiev confirms this trend (Figure 10). Within this group Ukraine declared the policy of “Neutrality, Non-Nuclear and Non-Block Status” as a founding principal of the initiative.¹⁴⁶

The GUAM is a regional Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, which consists of the four abovementioned states, was officially established at the summit in Yalta, Ukraine on June 6-7, 2001. Turkey and Latvia became the official observers of Organization. However, we should mention the cooperation between Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova started with the GUAM Consultative Forum, which was established on October 10, 1997 in Strasbourg. After Uzbekistan joined the initiative in 1999, the Organization was renamed as GUUAM. Due to the domestic problems, like Andijan Massacre of 2005, the tragic event, when Uzbek military fired into the crowd of protesters in Andijan and killed the hundreds of people, the Uzbekistan ended its membership. So, the organization returned its previous name. Today the organization sets the highest aims to expand the cooperation between the states. The main goals of the GUAM are the

¹⁴⁵ Mikhail A. Molchanov, *Political culture and national identity in Russian-Ukrainian relations*, Mikhail A. Molchanov, 2002, p. 265.

¹⁴⁶ Margarita Mercedes Balmaceda, *On the edge: Ukrainian-Central European-Russian security triangle*, Central European University Press, 2000, p. 8.

promotion of democratic values, respect to the principals of international law and human rights, strengthening of international and regional security and stability, European integration processes with a common security space, increased economic, energy, transport, scientific and humanitarian cooperation.¹⁴⁷

Due to the geopolitical interests GUAM gives Ukraine an instrument for the closer cooperation with other regional countries. For example, within the special program between the USA and GUAM on the trade, transport, border and customs control, combating terrorism, international crime and drug trafficking, the GUAM states in the cooperation with the US Government and the Centre SECI have implemented a number of joint projects. For example, GUAM launched a special Virtual Center for combating terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and other dangerous crimes.¹⁴⁸

Analyzing the relations between Ukraine and Russian Federation these relations remain one of the priorities of Ukrainian foreign policy. Since Ukraine and Russia began its start from one state ancient Kievan Rus the relations between these two countries are much more than just strategic. We will not analyze the relations between Ukraine and Russia in the Soviet Era or even earlier period, because it has nothing to do with the current political and socio-economic relations between two states.

Since the collapse of the USSR Ukrainian-Russian relations have been conflictive, unstable and often unpredictable. The most important issues, which Ukraine and Russia disagreed, relate to the role and functions of the CIS, the location of Russian navy in Ukraine (Sevastopol, Black sea), delimitation of borders, Ukrainian integration processes in the Euro-Atlantic organizations (especially in the context of the eastward enlargement of NATO), confrontation between the orthodox churches of Kiev and Moscow patriarchate, rights of Ukrainians and Russians in both countries and other problems of political and socio-economic character.¹⁴⁹

In the same time Ukraine and Russia are historically, geographically (both countries have more than 2250 km of the common state border), linguistically, culturally linked and remain more than just strategic partners. Ukraine and Russia are

¹⁴⁷ "History of Organization", GUAM The official web-page. Available at: <http://guam-organization.org/node/240> (Assessed on April, 22, 2011)

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Roman Solchanyk, *Ukraine and Russia: the post-Soviet transition*, Rowman & Littlefield, 2001, p. 9.

strongly interdependent in the economic sphere. Such interdependence forces both countries to strengthen the mutual beneficial cooperation, solve the problems and work on the further development of relations. As a result two countries signed Ukrainian – Russian Basic Treaty on May 1997 that marked the beginning of totally new relationship. The treaty included the mutual recognition of the borders and legal foundation of the relations between two countries. Under the treaty Ukrainian government allowed Russia to rent the land for its naval base in Crimea, Ukraine.¹⁵⁰

We should mention the fact of presence of Russian armed forces on the territory of Ukraine seriously worsened the bilateral relations. In order to balance with Russia Ukraine signed two military cooperation treaties with NATO in 1997 and 1998. In 1997 Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova established an informal group, previously discussed in this thesis, GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development. However, the President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma, who was accused in the murder of Ukrainian journalist Georgiy Gongadze in 2000, faced with rising political protests in Ukraine. In the search of support Ukrainian president addressed to the Russian leader Vladimir Putin. During his trip to Ukraine in 2001 Mr. Putin promised a full support of Ukrainian president in the exchange on the renewal of high level of cooperation between two countries.¹⁵¹

We should mention that it was not the first time of such “support” in the exchange of strategic partnership with Russia. Russia often used economic, including gas supplies, instruments to keep Ukraine away from the Euro-Atlantic integration processes and develop the “brothers” relations with Russia.

Anyways in the period prior to the Orange revolution the relations between Ukraine and Russia had improved to the qualitevely new level. Ukrainian President Kuchma oriented a foreign policy towards Moscow in his second term. The end of Kuchma’s regim and the Orange revolution in 2004 brought serious confrontations between two countries. The victory of pro-Western oriented President Viktor Yushchenko and his team marked a serious defeat of Russian foreign policy. Russia lost it’s the biggest strategic friend in Europe. The new-elected President Viktor Yushchenko, who declared its Euro-Atlantic integration ambitions, behaved negatively to the development of the relations with Russia and openly confronted in

¹⁵⁰ Roman Solchanyk, p. 9.

¹⁵¹ Robert H. Donaldson, Joseph L. Noguee, The foreign policy of Russia: changing systems, enduring interests, M.E. Sharpe, 2009, p. 173

the relations with Ukrainian the most strategic partner. We believe it was the biggest mistake of Yushchenko during his leadership in the sphere of foreign policy. The following economic crisis in Ukraine, which occurred in 2005, and political crisis, provoked by internal division in the Orange coalition, led to the dismissal of Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko's government in 2005.¹⁵²

As result Ukraine faced with the following years of political struggle for the power between the leaders of Orange revolution, absence of the complex of effective economic and social reforms and the stagnation of the state's development. Historically, culturally and economically Ukraine and Russia are very close states. However, the anti-Russian policy of the Orange leaders provoked a crisis in the relations between two countries.

Due to the low rate of Orange leaders opposition leader Viktor Yanukovich became a new president of Ukraine in 2009. Entering his position, Mr. Yanukovich argued, that anti-Russian position of previous political leadership seriously worsened Ukrainian economy, which was highly interdependent with Russia. At the same time Ukrainian pro-Western oriented leaders did not seriously benefited from Ukraine's relations with Europe. Yanukovich launched a new era of the pragmatic, equal and mutually beneficial relations between Ukraine and Russia. The first years of Yanukovich's presidency proved the importance of such relations for Ukraine. The strengthening of the economic, political, social, scientific and cultural cooperation was important for both countries. With presidency of Viktor Yanukovych Ukraine has also received a strong consolidated vertical oriented political leadership, which was very important in the terms of permanent struggle for power and political division of Ukraine. At the same time Ukrainian President did not appear to be pro-Russian. The well-maneuvering foreign policy of Viktor Yanukovich and his team lead to the serious improvement in the relations with Europe. Due to the long procedures of negotiations Ukraine is expecting to sign an Association Agreement with European Union this year.

¹⁵² Thomas Ambrosio, *Authoritarian backlash: Russian resistance to democratization in the former Soviet Union*, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2009, p. 142-149.

4. The geopolitical role of Ukraine in the globalization processes

4.1. Ukraine in the system of global international organizations

The role of international organizations as a form of international cooperation is very important in the modern system of multilateral international relations. The modern world is becoming increasingly complicated and controversial. There are more than 200 countries, tens of thousands political parties, millions of parliamentarians, ministers, heads of governments and presidents. Most of these politicians or political institutions have their own opinion on the development of their country, nation and world community in total. From the history we know that the different interpretation of national interests among the states could lead to the conflicts. That is why, international organizations are called to solve interstate conflicts, define a common goal for all the members of organizations.

Ukraine as a member of world community actively cooperates with other countries within a framework of international organizations. Before analysis of Ukraine's activity in the system of international organizations we would like to explore the legal base of Ukraine in the sphere of international relations and cooperation. The main document of Ukraine as the subject of international relations is "The Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine", adopted on by Verkhovna Rada (Parliament of Ukraine) on July 6, 1990. This document proclaimed that "Ukraine as a subject of international law shall conduct direct relations with other states, conclude agreements with them, exchange diplomatic, consular and trade missions, participate in activities of international organizations:... Ukraine shall act as an equal participant of international relations, actively promote strengthening of universal peace and international security, and directly participates in all-European process and European bodies".¹⁵³

From the Declaration on State Sovereignty of Ukraine we may conclude that Ukraine as a subject of international law considers international organizations as the form of multilateral cooperation with other countries. Ukraine expects to join the world community in the solving of global issues, including the providing of security and stability in European region. The main bodies to represent Ukraine and its geopolitical interests within a framework of international organizations are the

¹⁵³ "The History of Ukraine's Modern Foreign Service", The official web-page of the General Consulate of Ukraine to San-Francisco (USA). Available at: http://www.ukrainsf.com/inform/dovidky/dyp_ist_en.htm (Assessed on April 25, 2011)

President of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Parliament of Ukraine. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine is a part of Ukrainian government, which oversees the foreign policy of Ukraine and represents it in the international organizations. According to the other document "Declaration of Independence of Ukraine" Ukrainian territory shall be indivisible and inviolable. In the territory of Ukraine, the Constitution and laws of Ukraine shall be in effect from this day. The Act came into force on the date of adoption by the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament of Ukraine) on August 24, 1991.¹⁵⁴ With the proclamation of own independence Ukraine has received a right to conduct independent foreign policy and protect its geopolitical interests. As a sovereign state Ukraine is eligible to use all the legal instruments in its foreign policy. Ukraine builds mutually beneficial and friendly relations with other sovereign states on the bilateral basis and within a framework of international organizations.

"The Basic Directions of Ukraine's Foreign Policy" was approved as the national concept of foreign policy on July 2, 1993. According to the document Ukraine "due to its geopolitical location, historical experience, cultural traditions, rich natural resources, powerful economic, scientific/technical and intellectual potential, Ukraine ought to and should become an influential global state capable of playing a considerable role in providing political/economic stability in Europe. Active and full-scale accession to the global community is an inalienable condition of successful realization of Ukraine's possibilities. Overcoming crisis in society and proceeding along the path towards the world, Ukraine is guided by its fundamental national interests, in accordance to which the grounds, directions, priorities and functions of its foreign policy are determined".¹⁵⁵ It means that Ukraine as the largest contiguous European state conducts active foreign policy to provide the security and stability in the region. The foreign policy of Ukraine and its geopolitics derives from the geographical, economic, demographic, military and political potential of the state; is guided by the national interests and international law and called to make Ukraine influential member of global community.

¹⁵⁴ "Declaration of Independence of Ukraine", The official web-page of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine – Publications. Available at: www.mfa.gov.ua/mfa/en/publication/content/6528.htm (Assessed on April 18, 2011)

¹⁵⁵ "The History of Ukraine's Modern Foreign Service", The official web-page of the General Consulate of Ukraine to San-Francisco (USA). Available at: http://www.ukrainsf.com/inform/dovidky/dyp_ist_en.htm (Assessed on April 25, 2011)

Ukraine is an active participant of international organizations. Currently, Ukraine is a member of more than 40 intergovernmental and nongovernmental global and regional organizations. It is quite complicated and broad issue to analyze Ukrainian membership in all these organizations. The cooperation of Ukraine and such regional organizations as the Commonwealth of Independent States, the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, the European Union and the Visegrad Group was partly discussed in the previous chapter. Today we consider important to analyze Ukrainian activities in the main universal global organization such as the United Nations.

The United Nations (UN) is the biggest, most influential global and universal organization. The UN was created in the postwar period in 1945 to unite the nations and prevent another world war, strengthen an international security and cooperation in solving international economic, political and socio-cultural problems, promote respect for human rights and other fundamental freedoms. Organization provide a forum for its 192 Member States to cooperate on the wide range of issues, through the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and other bodies and committees.¹⁵⁶

The modern aims of the United Nations are:

- To promote and keep peace throughout the world;
- To develop friendly relations among nations;
- To help nations work together to improve the lives of poor people, to conquer hunger, disease and illiteracy, and to encourage respect for each other's rights and freedoms;
- To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations to achieve these goals.¹⁵⁷

The Charter of the United Nations, which was signed in San Francisco, USA, on June 27 in 1945, is the foundational treaty of the United Nations organization. It is an important fact that Ukraine was one of the first nations to put its signature under the United Nations Charter and became the founding member of the UN in 1945. Ukraine as a legal party of international relations was represented by own delegation at the founding session of the UN, while the Soviet Union delegation presented the

¹⁵⁶ "The United Nations at glance", The United Nations Official Web-page. Available at: <http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml> (Assessed on April 23, 2011)

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

interests of other 16 Soviet republics. Delegation of Ukraine actively participated in the writing of the United Nations Charter. The Head of the Ukrainian delegation at the United Nations Conference on International Organization Dmytro Manuilskiy was elected as a Chairman of the First Committee, which worked on the text and structure of the Preamble and Chapter 1 (Purposes and Principles) of the United Nations Charter.¹⁵⁸

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union Ukraine determined membership in the UN as one of its foreign policy priorities and simply continued to participate in this universal organization. On February 6, 1992 in a letter to the United Nations Secretary-General the Minister of Foreign Policy of Ukraine made the following statement: “As one of the founding states of the United Nations and as a member of the most of the international organizations of its system, Ukraine reaffirms its lofty obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and the acts establishing the relevant international organizations. Ukraine also reaffirms its obligations under international treaties concluded by the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic within the framework, or under the auspices, of such organizations, before the Declaration of the Independence of Ukraine.”¹⁵⁹ It means that Ukraine respects the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and continues to contribute to the UN activities in the field of international security and stability, respect for human rights, disarmament, economic and socio-cultural development and other spheres.

The history of the successful membership of Ukraine in the UN is confirmed by the high number of official visits of UN Secretaries-General to Ukraine. UN Secretaries-General visited Ukraine six times. In particular, U Thant visited Ukraine in 1962, Kurt Waldheim in 1981, Javier Perez de Cuellar in 1987, Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1993, Kofi Annan in 2002 and Pan Ki Mun in 2011.¹⁶⁰

Ukraine was active participant of the regulation processes in Yugoslavia crisis. Ukraine condemned the tragic events in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the escalation of the conflict between all the parties. Ukraine thought that peace in this region could be received only on the basis of the principles of respect for the political

¹⁵⁸ “Ukraine in the United Nations”, Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations official web-page. Available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.ua/uno/en/4263.htm> (Assessed on April 24, 2011)

¹⁵⁹ Pierre Michel Eisemann, Martti Koskenniemi, Hague Academy of International Law, La succession d'États: la codification à l'épreuve des faits, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000, p. 269.

¹⁶⁰ “Ukraine in the United Nations”, Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations official web-page. Available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.ua/uno/en/4263.htm> (Assessed on April 24, 2011)

independence of the internationally recognized State of Bosnia and Herzegovina and respect by all neighbors of its territorial integrity. The delegation of Ukraine to the UN claimed about the importance of peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the Ukrainian battalion carried out the peacekeeping mission.¹⁶¹

The history of Ukrainian the UN Peacekeeping activities starts with adoption by Verkhovna Rada (Parliament of Ukraine) the resolution № 2538-XII on 3 July 1992 “On participation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in UN Peacekeeping Forces in conflict zones on the territory of Former Republic of Yugoslavia”. Since that time Ukraine sent more than 40 000 of its citizens to the UN Peacekeeping missions in more than 20 countries. From that time 49 Ukrainian peacekeepers lost their lives in missions. Ukraine is currently participating in 6 ongoing UN peacekeeping operations.¹⁶²

For the last 20 years, Ukrainian soldiers participated in the following peacekeeping operations:

- - Peacekeeping operations of UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR, Jul 1992 – Dec 1995);
- - UN mission in Tajikistan (UNMIT, Dec 1994 - Mar 2000);
- - UN Mission of preventive deployment in Macedonia (UNPREDEP, Jun 1995 – Mar 1999);
- - International Stabilization Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR in B&H, Dec 1995 – Dec 1999);
- - UN Mission in Angola (UNMIA, Jan 1996 – Feb 1999);
- - UN mission in Prevlaka peninsula, Croatia (UNMIP, Jan 1996 – Dec 2002);
- - UN Mission in Eastern Slavonia (UNMIES, Apr 1996 – Jan 1998);
- - UN Mission in Guatemala (UNMIG, Jan -May 1997);
- - OSCE verification mission in Kosovo (Dec 1998 – Mar 1999);
- - Special UN Mission in Afghanistan (Apr 2000 – May 2001);
- - United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL, Jul 2000 – Aug 2006);

¹⁶¹ Daniel Bethlehem, Marc Weller, The 'Yugoslav' crisis in international law: General issues, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 254.

¹⁶² “The history of the armed forces of Ukraine participation in peacekeeping operations”, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. Available at: <http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=en&part=peacekeeping&sub=history> (Assessed on April 26, 2011)

- - OSCE Mission in Georgia (Aug 2000 – Dec 2005);
- - United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL, Dec 2000 – Dec 2005);
- - Multinational Forces in Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom, Aug 2003 – Dec 2005);
- - UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE, Dec 2000 – Jul 2008);
- - Multinational forces in Iraq (Dec 2005 – Dec 2008);
- - UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG, Aug 2001 – Jun 2009).¹⁶³

Being a part of the UN peacekeeping contingent Ukraine is deeply convinced that the security and safety of its personnel is the central element of any peacekeeping operation. As a result Ukraine initiated elaboration of the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, adopted by UN General Assembly in 1994. In September 2006 Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine signed an Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel. Ukraine also initiated the International Day of United Nations Peacekeepers which was designated by the UN General Assembly in 2002 to be marked annually on 29 of May in honor of the memory of those who have lost their lives for peace and those, who continue to serve in the UN peacekeeping operations.

164

In addition to the peacekeeping activities the UN should become the universal global organization, which would prevent the escalation of conflict and avoid the necessity of such peacekeeping operations. The United Nations is not an “ideal” organization. It should complete a large complex of reforms to reach this status and make the world free of conflicts and wars. However, the process of the UN reforms started long time ago. Ukraine also participates in the UN reforms. For example, in 1997 Hennadiy Udovenko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on that time, was elected as a President of the 52nd UN General Assembly session, which is one of the offices in the UN system. Ukraine should be proud that the 52nd session of the UN General Assembly entered the history as the "session of reforms". That Session

¹⁶³ “The history of the armed forces of Ukraine participation in peacekeeping operations”, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. Available at: <http://www.mil.gov.ua/index.php?lang=en&part=peacekeeping&sub=history> (Assessed on April 26, 2011)

¹⁶⁴ “Ukraine in the United Nations”, Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations official web-page. Available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.ua/uno/en/4263.htm> (Assessed on April 24, 2011)

accepted a comprehensive Program of the Organization's reform and gave a start for the formation of more effective the United Nations.¹⁶⁵

In the system of the United Nations Ukraine is a member of several principal and subsidiary UN organs such as the Human Rights Council, Committee on Contributions, Commission on Social Development, Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Statistical Commission, Commission on Population and Development, Executive Board of the World Food Programme (WFP), Executive Board of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). During its membership in the UN Ukraine was elected as non-permanent member of the Security Council for three times (1948-1949, 1984-1985, 2000-2001), a member of the UN Economic and Social Council for five times, the President of the Executive Board of the UNDP/UNFPA (2006), representatives of Ukraine served as chairmen of a number of important committees at the UN General Assembly sessions.¹⁶⁶

At the same time Ukraine is recipient of technical, material and financial assistance from the numerous UN institutions, such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Global Ecological Fund (GEF), International Labor Organization (ILO), United Nations Conference On Trade And Development (UNCTAD), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), United Nations Population Fund (UNPFA), International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Universal Postal Union (UPU), World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and others. The UNDP opened its Ukrainian office in 1993 to assist the economic, social, ecological and other reforms in Ukraine.¹⁶⁷ Currently 13 International Organizations, Agencies, and Associated Institutions of the UN System with resident missions and programs and about 800 staff members work in Ukraine to enhance the cooperation between the United Nations and Ukraine in the spheres of socio-economic development, good governance, rule of law, respect for human rights and other activities, which respond the aims of the UN Charter.¹⁶⁸

For geopolitical interests of Ukraine it is significant fact to host such number of the UN representatives. Ukraine welcomes the progress on the reform of the

¹⁶⁵ "Ukraine in the United Nations", Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations official web-page. Available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.ua/uno/en/4263.htm> (Assessed on April 24, 2011)

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

United Nations during the last years and believes in the future of this Organization as the universal global organization, which promotes the principles of peace, security and welfare.

Among other long-standing important issues in the collaboration between Ukraine and the United Nations is problem of the 1986 Chornobyl nuclear power Station accident. Ukraine continues to cooperate closely with the UN in the sphere of nuclear safety. For example, Ukraine and its capital Kiev hosted the world's Summit on the Safe and Innovative Use of Nuclear Energy on April 2011. The visit of the United Nations Secretary - General Ban Ki Mun proved an importance of Ukraine in the global nuclear security. Mr. Mun emphasized on the need of global rethink on nuclear safety and role of Ukraine in the global security: "Ukraine has been a leader on nuclear issues. It earned the world's admiration when it voluntarily gave up its nuclear arsenal. ... The international community stood firm on principle: that in a democracy, people have the right to choose their leaders. Leaders must respect the choice of leader. The power comes from the people. If you follow the news, you know how this story turns out. But you may not know how Ukraine figures prominently in this process... Across the world, wherever United Nations peacekeepers serve, Ukraine is there: Kosovo; Sudan; Liberia; Timor-Leste; and, most importantly, Côte d'Ivoire... Ukraine contributes to peace and security across the world. Closer to home, Ukraine is a bridge, a regional player able to talk to big and small countries alike, east and west, north and south."¹⁶⁹

The words of the UN Secretary-General confirm our thesis about the defining role of Ukrainian geopolitical location in the national foreign policy. Ukraine has to continue its work to prove its regional leadership status. The current geopolitical reality in the system of international relations requires the reform of the UN. The Central-Eastern Europe plays an important role in the context of European security and stability. That is why, we think that Ukrainian leadership has to think about the possibility of allocation of an additional non-permanent seat at the UN Security

¹⁶⁸ "The United Nations in Ukraine", The United Nations in Ukraine, Department of Public Information, Kiev. Available at: <http://un.org.ua/> (Assessed on April 26, 2011)

¹⁶⁹ "Secretary-General, addressing Kyiv Institute of International Relations, hails Ukraine's leading role in nuclear disarmament, peacekeeping", The United Nations, Department of Public Information, New York, 21 April 2011. Available at: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sgsm13518.doc.htm> (Assessed on April 28, 2011)

Council to the Group of Eastern Europe and actively promotes this idea within a framework of the UN.¹⁷⁰

The United Nations is an effective instrument for Ukraine to achieve the world's recognition of the Great Famine (Holodomor) of 1932-1933, one of the most tragic events in the history of humanity. The Great Famine, which was resulted in the death of 7 to 10 million people (a population of a mid-size European country), was officially recognized a national tragedy of the Ukrainian people caused by the Soviet totalitarian regime in 2003. The Joint Statement on the 70th anniversary of Holodomor was signed by 36 delegations and supported by 28 other UN Member States. The list of states, who signed this document includes Albania, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Monaco, Norway, Poland, Saint Lucia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. Ukraine actively promotes the issue of Holodomor within a framework of the UN in order to bring a wider international attention to this tragedy of Ukrainian nation so that similar genocides could be avoided in future.¹⁷¹

At present Ukraine's First Deputy Prime Minister/Minister for Economic Development and Trade Andriy Kliuyev and representatives of the UN System in Ukraine signed Government of Ukraine-United Nations Partnership Framework (PF) for 2012-2016 in Kiev on March, 2011.¹⁷² The PF includes “the fundamentals for strategic planning and UN activities in Ukraine for the next 5 years according to 4 key areas of partnership: sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction, social development, governance and management, environment and climate change. The new document sets a common commitment to supporting the reform process, achieving international standards, European integration, Millennium Development

¹⁷⁰ “Ukraine in the United Nations”, Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations official web-page. Available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.ua/uno/en/4263.htm> (Assessed on April 24, 2011)

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² “Government of Ukraine – United Nations Partnership Framework 2012-2016”, United Nations Development Programme - Europe & CIS. Available at: <http://europeandcis.undp.org/home/show/BEDE1D65-F203-1EE9-B379C65BFEC5AE5B> (Assessed on April, 28, 2011)

Goals, as well as implementing the terms of international human rights norms by Ukraine.”¹⁷³

According to the Ukraine – UN Partnership Framework program the priorities for cooperation are directly linked to the “realizing of one or several human rights, social and economic development, supporting full and meaningful civil society participation and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. The principles of universality and inalienability, indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness, non discrimination and equality, participation and inclusion, accountability and the rule of law are all central to each of the future areas of cooperation identified by Ukraine and the UN System in the PF.”¹⁷⁴

The programme is expected to replace the UN Development Assistance Framework for Ukraine 2006-2010. Mr. Kliuyev stated that the new framework programme will greatly contribute to the processes of development of an innovative potential of Ukraine, reforms in public administration and judicial system, improving the quality of social policy. Twenty UN agencies will participate in this program, and 132 million of the US dollars will be granted by the UN System organizations to achieve the goals of this partnership framework program.¹⁷⁵ According to Mr. Oliver Adam, the UN Coordinator in Ukraine, the Framework Partnership Program will be “the main instrument response to UN national development priorities identified in key national plans and strategies”.¹⁷⁶

For Ukraine this Partnership program is very important instrument in the cooperation with the United Nations. The extended cooperation might help Ukraine’s socio-economic development and the achievement of Ukraine’s international commitments.

In conclusion, we see the United Nations as an important global organization, which is called to unite the nations and prevent the escalation of conflicts and wars,

¹⁷³ “Ukraine, UN sign Framework Partnership Programme 2012-2016”, National Radio Company of Ukraine (NRCU) - News – 25.03.2011. Available at: <http://www.nrcu.gov.ua/index.php?id=148&listid=141997> (Assessed on April, 30, 2011)

¹⁷⁴ “Government of Ukraine – United Nations Partnership Framework 2012-2016”, United Nations Development Programme - Europe & CIS. Available at: <http://europeandcis.undp.org/home/show/BEDE1D65-F203-1EE9-B379C65BFEC5AE5B> (Assessed on April, 28, 2011)

¹⁷⁵ “Ukraine, UN sign Framework Partnership Programme 2012-2016”, National Radio Company of Ukraine (NRCU) - News – 25.03.2011. Available at: <http://www.nrcu.gov.ua/index.php?id=148&listid=141997> (Assessed on April, 30, 2011)

¹⁷⁶ “Ukraine and the UN signed Partnership Programme for 2012-2016”, Finance.UA, 25.03.2011. Available at: <http://news.finance.ua/ua/~1/0/all/2011/03/25/232484> (Assessed on April 30, 2011)

strengthen cooperation in solving international economic, political and socio-cultural problems. For Ukraine the United Nations is a powerful instrument to protect national interests and fundamental principals of domestic and foreign policy, assist economic and political reforms and receive a world's recognition of its regional leadership status.

4.2.The global problems of international community: the view from Kiev

Today we live in the world, where every single individual and country can not exist in isolation. All of us live are interconnected and influenced by the same political, economic, socio-cultural, and informational changes. Pollution, corruption, human-trafficking, the proliferation of nuclear weapons or any other global problems do not have passports. The increasing process of globalization makes us more interdependent than it was centuries ago.¹⁷⁷ The former the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said: "Globalization is bringing more choices and new opportunities for prosperity. It is making us more familiar with global diversity. However, millions of people around the world experience globalization not as an agent of progress but as a disruptive force, almost hurricane-like in its ability to destroy lives, jobs, and traditions. Many have an urge to resist the process and take refuge in the illusory comforts of nationalism, fundamentalism, or other isms."¹⁷⁸

It is true. In the last decade the world community faced with a large number of global issues that affected all mankind. The existence of humanity directly depends on the solving of these problems. It can be achieved only by joint efforts of all countries and international organizations. These problems of global character include such issues as issues in proliferation of deadly, including nuclear, weapons, demographic problems, environmental problems, the increasing number of regional conflicts and wars, energy, food, diseases, peaceful exploration of space and ocean, corruption and many other problems. Every day we hear different negative predictions about the future of the world. However, only few of us try to change the situation and actively participate in the solving of global problems.

For Ukraine as a member of world's community it is extremely important to include the problems of global character to the modern geopolitical doctrine. Ukraine

¹⁷⁷ Kofi Annan, "Problems Without Passports", Foreign Policy;Sep/Oct2002, Issue 132, p. 30 . Available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2002/09/01/problems_without_passports (Assessed on April 30, 2011)

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

has faced seriously with the problem of global character in 1986, when the biggest world's nuclear disaster had a place in Chernobyl. In addition after the collapse of the USSR Ukraine inherited the world's second nuclear potential. The new policy of disarmament and non-proliferation became a part of domestic and foreign policy.

In the previous paragraphs we discussed an importance of Ukraine's cooperation with the United Nations in the field of global problems and especially the problems of global security. However, before we start to explore Ukraine's role in the globalizations processes in more detailed way we should divide global problems in the categories. In our opinion the global problems are divided into political, economic, demographic, social and ecological.

The most important global problems are political. Since humanity invented the nuclear, biological, chemical and other deadly weapon, our world faced with the serious danger, because the usage of such weapon in local conflicts with political reasons could create great problems for all humanity. Ukraine, which had the world's third nuclear potential, voluntarily refused from the nuclear weapon and significantly contributed to the global security and stability. However, other states like India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea declare the desire to develop such weapon. These actions together with the numerous regional conflicts, revolutionary separatist movements and permanent confrontation among the countries for a regional or global domination seriously threaten the current world's order. In the same time Ukraine pays an especial attention to the conflict situations in the neighbor countries. The conflicts in Transdnistrovya area, Russia (Chechnya), Caucasus and other "frozen" conflicts in the former Soviet states are the part of global political problems. For Ukrainian leadership it is quite important to continue its work on the prevention of escalation conflicts in a region.

The term "global" in the global ecological policy means all this transborder cooperation between the countries in the sphere of management of environmental problems. The modern "ecological crisis" appeared only in the end of the World War II. The increasing energy and resource consumption linked with economic developments processes, rising of pollution, global warming, demographic growth and the proliferation of new technologies, including nuclear weapon, created a serious threat to the all human civilization.¹⁷⁹ The best world's scientists-

¹⁷⁹ Richard Devetak, Anthony Burke, Jim George, *An Introduction to International Relations: Australian Perspectives*, Cambridge University Press, 2007 - Pages: 462, p. 363.

environmentalists, governments and non-profit organizations today work on the prevention of ecological catastrophes. The first such institution, which started focusing on improving the environmental situation, was the Club of Rome. The organization was established in 1968 and united outstanding scientists from all over the world. Ukrainian scientists have also participated in the environmental research processes, especially the situation related to the evaluation of the biosphere. They considered that a human as a part of technological civilization can threaten the biosphere as the global system. Such Ukrainian scientists as V. Los, E. Hirusov, F. Hirenok and M. Rebane considered the destructive changes in the biosphere as a global system as a result of the influence of human "pressure". So, the solving of the ecological crisis includes a research on this "pressure" and the object of such "pressure".

Another scientist position T. Bachinsky based his theories on consideration that society and nature compose one system. He insisted on the immediate stop of the progressive destruction of the biosphere, because the result of this destruction will lead to the total collapse of socioecosystem. He admitted that the damaged biosphere will have a chance to restore its dynamic equilibrium again, but in the place where people will not exist anymore. That is why, the humanity has no choice and must change their attitude to the nature.¹⁸⁰

In some context the position of Ukrainian environmentalists and globalists remain as same pessimistic as the position of the Club of Rome. However, we consider that these scholars have reasonable arguments to claim in such manner. In Ukraine the ecological situation is result of the existence of Ukraine within the USSR. According to the Soviet planned, command-administrative system, economy developed without taking into account environmental problems. The huge allocation of chemical, metallurgical, mining production in the East of Ukraine created harmful environmental situation in these regions. The ecological situation was seriously worsened after terrible environmental consequences of the Chernobyl disaster. Today Ukraine has 15 operating nuclear reactors, and builds 3 more. Such fact creates a

¹⁸⁰ L. Sydorenko, "“Ecological problems among the global problems of humanity”, The Taras Shevchenko University of Kiev. Available at: <http://www.philsci.univ.kiev.ua/biblio/Cidorenko/Cid-ekol-7.html> (Assessed on April 30, 2011)

serious threat to the environmental situation in Ukraine and region.¹⁸¹ In this case only effective Ukraine's government environmental policy together with cooperation with the international organizations can prevent the ecological catastrophes.

Other serious global problem is population growth. Since the last 40 years the world's population doubled and reached 7 billion people. Experts predict that the population would rich to 9 billion by 2050 (Figure 11). Such demographic changes will increase requirements for food, water, energy, and health care in countries where basic necessities were already limited. Malnourishment, lack of clean water, HIV-Aids and other diseases, overcrowding, and inadequate shelter, conflicts for provision and energy resources are the negative consequences of this global problem.¹⁸² In the same time some countries, including Ukraine, feel another problem – problem of depopulation processes. In 2006, Ukraine's population was estimated to about 46.7 million people, almost 2.4 million fewer than it was in 2000. Historically, there are few explanations to such situation in Ukraine. First, the negative consequences of the World War II, where Ukraine lost millions of human lives, provoked the situation, when the today, later few generations women far outnumber men. In the East Slavic societies, which are considered traditionally patriarchal, and having sons is more desirable than having daughters. The transformation of Ukraine from rural agricultural to modern urban industrial state influenced declining rates in the population growth (urban families are much smaller than rural). With the dissolution of the USSR Ukraine received the difficult economic situation. As a result many people immigrated to the other countries in the 1990s.¹⁸³ Similarly to other European countries Ukraine faced with other problem related to the aging of population.

In the context of the improvement of demographic situation in Ukraine we offer to adopt the new strategic national program, which would include the following elements:

- Promotion of voluntary repatriation of people with historical Ukrainian roots to homeland;

¹⁸¹ L. Sydorenko, ““Ecological problems among the global problems of humanity”, The Taras Shevchenko University of Kiev. Available at: <http://www.philsci.univ.kiev.ua/biblio/Cidorenko/Cid-ekol-7.html> (Assessed on April 30, 2011)

¹⁸² Heather E. Lindsay, “Global population growth”, CSA Web-page. Available at: <http://www.csa.com/discoveryguides/ern/01mar/overview.php> (Assessed on April 30, 2011)

¹⁸³ Catherine W. Cooper, Ukraine, Infobase Publishing, 2006 - Pages: 120, p. 49.

- Improvement of the socio-economic living conditions;
- Optimization of external and internal migration of population;
- Support and consolidation of professional in the rural area;
- Implementation of national healthcare programs;
- Formation of high prestige of family in the society.

Under economic and social global problems we should understand the complex of interconnected negative factors, which influence the level of welfare of every single individual or country. Economic and social problems include economic inequality, child labor, energy crises, corruption, economic disasters, unemployment, poverty, domestic violence and many other problems. Ukraine as a part of international community actively contributes to the solving of global economic and social problems. The President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich declared at the UN Summit on the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in 2010 that “Ukrainian state is ready to use its agricultural potential to assist the eradication of hunger on the planet... We responsibly work towards threats of food crisis. Last year Ukraine became for the first time a donor to the UN World Food Program”.¹⁸⁴ The President Yanukovich also described Ukraine’s efforts to the complete modernization of the economy and social policy, which are designed to respond the MDGs. These reforms include the increased level of minimum social standards, where Ukraine has significantly reduced number of people living below the poverty line.¹⁸⁵

In conclusion, a popular internet blog “The Foreign policy of Ukraine” names the following global problems and the ways to solve them:

- Economic inequality. This problem is an especially important because its solution leads to the solving of all other problems. The top 20 industrialized and developed countries consume 20 times more resources than all other states. Now we conclude that the development of consumer society and its unequal distribution to all countries in the world can lead to the planetary catastrophe.
- Issues of war and peace, international security, disarmament and conversion determine the level of confidence and cooperation between the nations.

¹⁸⁴ “Ukraine is ready to solve the global problems”, URA – Infom press agency, September 22, 2010. Available at: <http://ura-inform.com/uk/politics/2010/09/22/ukraina> (Assessed on April 30, 2011)

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

Disarmament is a key to create an international secure world. Solving this problem should be made by the efforts of all states and people.

- The environmental problems are a result of increasing human poisoning and pollution of land, water and atmosphere. A substantial violation of the balance of the gas composition of the atmosphere, ozone layer of the atmosphere, the state of living and inanimate nature are the reason of the ecological catastrophe. International community has to unite in order to stop the damaging of our planet.
- Food problem – food shortages in many countries cause the death of millions people every year. The launch of World Food Program at the United Nations is an instrument to prevent this problem. The worlds leading agricultural states, such as Argentina, Brazil, USA, France, China and Australia should become responsible for this project. Ukraine as one of the leading European agricultural states should actively expand the its donor assistance to the WFP
- The demographic problems are rapid growth of population in some regions (Africa, Asia, Oceania) and depopulation processes and ageing of population in European states, including Ukraine.
- The socio-economic problems refer social, economic and individual rights and freedoms, combating international crime and terrorism, drug addiction, the humanization of international relations. All these issues concern each of us. The consolidation of cooperation among all the countries will create a framework to solve the global problems in the close future.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁶ “Global problems of international community”, Ukraine Foreign policy blog. Available at: <http://ukraine-foreign-policy.com/international-relations/global-problems-of-international-community.html> (Assessed on May 1, 2011)

Conclusion

In conclusion we would like to summarize the main results of our research and formulate the final position on the most optimal geopolitical doctrine, which would respond the main geopolitical interests of Ukraine.

The main results, which have theoretical and practical importance, are:

1. We systematically analyzed the major theoretical approaches to the term “geopolitics” and “national interest” in general and Ukrainian geopolitics and its interests, in particular. In our opinion, the term “geopolitics” is wider than its classic interpretation. We see “geopolitics” as the national doctrine of the state or its national science, which is called to form and promote a strategy of decision-making processes that would protect vital national interests. This strategy is often based on the territorial size and location of the state, its military strength, natural resources, population, economic growth, historical and socio-cultural development. The first approach simply equates the national interest with the interest of decision-makers, who are responsible for the foreign policy defined and defended by the state authority. The second approach explains the national interest in the terms of the nature of international relations and the motivations of state. In the anarchic system of the international relations the interest is often defined in the terms of power, and power in the terms of interest (Realist school of thought). The last third approach explains the “national interest” as something, which derives from the nation’s preferences of democratic state. For us, it is important to have a clear understanding of the history of Ukrainian nation and state-building processes, the traditions of Ukrainian political, socio-economic, cultural and religious life to understand all the specifics of Ukrainian geopolitical processes and formulate the national interests of Ukraine.
2. We conducted an analysis of the formation of Ukraine’s geopolitics in the historical perspective. The analysis of history of Ukraine’s foreign policy and geopolitics from the era of Kievan Rus to the modern period of Ukrainian state revealed that geographical, political, economic and socio-cultural position of Ukraine was changing throughout the history. At the same time historically, mentally and culturally Ukrainian nation remained

to be an integral part of European community. Historically Ukrainian state was located at the crossroads of Western and Eastern civilization. This fact became a reason for the artificial division of Ukrainian people and the absence of social and political unity for the long centuries. Started from Kievan Rus, a precursor of the future Eastern European Slavic countries, Ukraine underwent more than a thousand year history of struggle for own geopolitical interests. Ukrainian nation was forced to lose the state independence in the different periods of time. However, Ukrainian people could recover its full independence and the right to conduct own foreign policy, which would respond the national interests.

3. Today Ukraine as a modern European state conducts an open multidimensional foreign policy, which is called to expand cooperation with all interested partners, and provide the protection of own geopolitical interests. At the same time Ukrainian government wants to build the relations with its strategic partners exclusively on the principles of voluntarism, mutual aid, mutual non-aggression, equality, mutual benefit, non-interference in internal affairs and peaceful coexistence. The precondition for the analysis of the relations between Ukraine and its strategic partners is a clear understanding of the basic historical values, principals and interests of Ukrainian people. For country, which fought for own independence for the long centuries, the question of sovereignty and territorial integrity, welfare of own citizens, respect to the human rights and main principals of international law define the aims Ukrainian geopolitics.
4. Due to its unique geopolitical location between the Slavic Eurasia and Western Europe Ukraine has a wide range of geopolitical interests not only within a region, but also outside this region. The main principles on which Ukraine develops its own foreign policy based on the respect of international law, the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe and other international documents. Throughout the history Ukraine had to reorient its interests and find new partners. Ukraine as a potential regional leader state builds pragmatic and mutually beneficial relations with all countries. However, the relations with other regional post-socialist states of the Central-Eastern Europe and the

Commonwealth of Independent States are defined as key priorities of Ukrainian foreign policy. The relations with the countries of the CEE and CIS are characterized as friendly and mutually beneficial. Such relationship is explained not only, by the common socialist past, but similar history of transition processes, cultural similarities and the position on the global issues. After Ukraine's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty the USA and Russia became new strategic partners of Ukraine. Due to the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances of 1994 both countries declared their security guarantees and strategic cooperation with Ukraine. Historically, geographically, linguistically, and culturally Ukraine and Russia are linked and interdependent. Such interdependence explains the high level of strategic mutual beneficial cooperation in the relations between two countries. The USA is a key partner of Ukraine in the sphere of democracy, economic and political reforms, military, transport, nuclear, aerospace and scientific cooperation. For Ukraine the strategic partnership with the USA is especially important. The USA is powerful enough to counter the strategic weight of other strategic partner, neighboring Russia with its little, but still imperialist ambitions, extremely growing China or the potential threat from the hypothetical union of Islamic states.

5. Ukraine as a member of world community actively cooperates with other countries within a framework of international organizations. As a subject of international law Ukraine considers international organizations as an effective instrument for the multilateral cooperation with other countries in the solving of its geopolitical interests. As a founding member of the United Nations Ukraine considers this universal organization as a framework to promote and keep peace throughout the world, develop friendly relations with other nations and help nations work together to solve the global problems. Ukraine is an active member of all the agencies and structures within the UN System. The UN Peacekeeping activity, World Food Program, nuclear safety projects is a short example of such collaboration between Ukraine and the United Nations. The main document to regulate the cooperation between Ukraine – the United Nations is Partnership Framework program, which is called to expand the

cooperation on the respect for human rights, social and economic development, support civil society participation and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. The principles of universality, indivisibility, interdependence, non discrimination, equality, participation and inclusion, accountability and the rule of law are all central in the cooperation within a framework of this program.

Before we formulate our personal recommendation on the most optimal geopolitical doctrine of Ukraine, we would like to summarize the main theoretical considerations about the geopolitical potential of Ukraine.

Being the largest contiguous European state (in size it is bigger than France, Germany or Spain), Ukraine owns a unique geopolitical location in Europe. It stands at the crossroads of the main transport and trade routs between Eurasia and Western Europe. Ukraine owns an access to the Black and Asov seas, the wide rivers network and the large areas of lands suitable for agricultural industries (over 40 million hectares). Ukraine is rich in mineral resources, including the reserves of coal, iron ore, nickel, uranium, the world's largest reserves of sulfur, the second world's largest reserves of mercury ore and many others. More than 48 million people live in Ukraine, which makes it the fifth most populous European country. Ukraine has one of the biggest military potential in a region and Europe in total. Ukraine is an active participant of the United Nation Peacekeeping mission. Since 1992 more Ukraine sent more than 40 000 soldiers to the 20 countries. Ukraine is currently participating in 6 on-going operations. High level of intellectual, scientific and economic potential, including high-technologies (like aerospace engineering and nuclear research) makes Ukraine an important geopolitical player in the region.

In addition, the author welcomes a clear understanding of the current Ukrainian leadership to continue its further political and socio-economic development in order to keep the status of regional leader. In this regard, basing on the recent trends in Ukraine's geopolitics, analysis of history of Ukraine, the geostrategic relations of Ukraine with its partners and current globalization processes we would like to conclude the following geopolitical doctrine of Ukraine:

“Ukraine as a sovereign independent nation, who fought for the long centuries for own independence, determines the question of sovereignty and territorial integrity, welfare of own citizens and the respect to the main principals of international law as the key priority of its geopolitics. Historically, geographically

and culturally Ukraine is an integral part of European community. In this regard, Ukraine should continue to strengthen its economic and political potential, including the intensification of participation in Euro-Atlantic integration processes. At the same time, Ukraine should not gain a membership in any political supranational organizations, which could threaten national interests. In the cooperation with such institutions, including military organizations, Ukraine needs to follow the principle of “active neutrality”. However, Ukraine considers such organizations as an effective instrument for the multilateral cooperation with other countries in the solving of global problems, including security in Europe and world, in total. The conclusion of bilateral and multilateral treaties, participation in European and global security structures, and active cooperation with such organizations as NATO, EU, and the United Nations will provide the establishment of security and peace in Ukraine. Being a member of international community Ukraine develops strategic relations with all countries in correspondence with geopolitical interests and priorities of Ukraine. The strengthening and consolidation of strategic relations with neighboring countries of the Central-Eastern Europe and the New Independent States is an extremely important for Ukraine in the context of regional stability and security. Ukraine should also support and continue to develop equal and mutually beneficial political, socio-economic and cultural relations with its strategic partners USA and Russian Federation. Being located at the crossroads of East and West of Europe r Ukraine needs to create its own system of national security, balanced and coordinated, which would respond European and global international security. Ukraine should also continue its political and socio-economic development processes in order to become democratic, stable and economically developed state.”

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Appendices

Table 1 Halford Mackinder's geopolitical story

<i>Epoch</i>	<i>Dominant drama</i>	<i>Dominant mobility of power type</i>	<i>Ascendant region and power</i>
Pre-Columbian	Asiatic invasions of Europe	Horse and camel	The landpower of the Asian steppes
Columbian	European overseas expansionism	Sailing vessels and sea transportation	The seapower of the European colonial empires
Post-Columbian	Closed space and the struggle for relative efficiency	Railways	The landpower of those who control the heartland

Source: Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby, Paul Routledge, The geopolitics reader, Routledge, 2006 – Pages: 302, p. 20

Table 2. Ukraine's bordering states

Country	Border length (km)
Belarus	975
Hungary	135.1
Moldova	1 191
Poland	543
Romania	625.4
Russia	2 063
Slovakia	98.5

Source: "Enlargement and Ukraine's Relations with other Central and Eastern European Countries", Oleksandr Pavlyuk, NATO Publications. Available at: <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-00/pavliuk.pdf> (Assessed on March 20, 2011)

Table 3. Areas of negotiation for EU – Ukraine Association agreement

Economic and Sectoral Cooperation	FTA+
Company law Sports Tourism Management of public finances Health policy Energy, including nuclear energy Environmental cooperation Industrial and commercial policy Cross-border and regional cooperation Education Training and youth Culture Research and technological development Macro-economic cooperation Social cooperation Mining and metals Agriculture and rural development Transport and audio-visual policy Taxation Statistics Consumer protection Information society and space Civil society Financial markets Fisheries and maritime issues	Trade in goods (Trade Defense Instrument and tariffs/tariff barriers to trade) Trade and sustainable development Rules of origin Services Intellectual property rights (incl. geographical indications) Trade facilitation and customs Public procurement Competition (anti-trust and state aid) Sanitary and phytosanitary standards

Source: Julia Langbein, "The EU-Ukraine FTA: Plus or minus?", ICPS. Available at: http://www.icps.com.ua/files/articles/54/76/EF_November_2009_ENG.pdf (Assessed on March 20, 2011)

Figure 1 The Geographical Pivot of History




Source: Derneğimiz Hakkında - The Geographical Pivot of History - <http://www.habitat.org.tr/jeopolitik/391-the-geographical-pivot-of-history.html> (Assessed on March 20, 2011)

Figure 2. Map of Kievan Rus' at its zenith



Source: Britannica Encyclopedia – Ukraine – Kievan Rus
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/612921/Ukraine/30062/Kievan-Rus?anchor=ref404367>
 (Assessed on March 20, 2011)

Figure 3. Map of Galicia - Volhynia



Source:

http://www.personal.psu.edu/jrl5115/blogs/jesse_lobodinskys_ukrainian_100_blog/2010/04/ukraine-after-1240.html (Assessed on March 20, 2011)

Figure 4. Ukraine during 1914-1919



Source: Ukrcenter – Maps -

http://www.ukrcenter.com/!FilesRepository/Photogallery/_GAL2/map21.jpg (Assessed on March 20, 2011)

Figure 5. Ukrainian People's Republic



Source: World News - Ukrainian People's Republic Map - http://cdn.wn.com/pd/cf/87/e40fe81256e08e83b1ed0708c26d_grande.jpg (Assessed on March 20, 2011)

Figure 6. Ukraine after the World War II. Map.




Source: BBC Europe - http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/europe/04/changing_borders/html/1945.stm (Assessed on March 20, 2011)

Figure 7. The geographical center of Europe in the county of Rakhiv, Transcarpathian region, Ukraine



Source: Mandria.ua Web-page – Rakhiv- <http://www.mandria.ua/sights/633.html> (Assessed on March 20, 2011)

Figure 8. The map of European states dependant on Russian gas




Source: The official web-page of Atlantic Council - http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/europe-russia-ukraine-gas-crisis-multimedia (Assessed on March 20, 2011)

Figure 9. The national gas transportation system of Ukraine


Capacities and Actual Volumes of Natural Gas Transit by Ukrainian Gas Transmission System (years 2008, 2009)
billion cubic meters

Input capacity - 288
Output capacity - 178.5
(incl. to Central and Western Europe - 142.1)



Source: Kyivpost web -page - <http://www.kyivpost.com/blogs/blogger/396/post/5279/> (Assessed on March 20, 2011)

Figure 10. Organization for Democracy and Economic Development – Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova - GUAM



Source: Kiwix library - Organization for Democracy and Economic Development – Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova – GUAM - http://library.kiwix.org:4201/A/GUAM_Organization_for_Democracy_and_Economic_Development.html (Assessed on March 20, 2011)